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PROTECTING THE VICTIM: RAPE AND
SEXUAL HARASSMENT SHIELDS UNDER
MATE AND FEDERAL LAW
It would be a hard rule that would compel a plaintiff to defend
every act of his life, as the price of justice.1
I. INTRODUCrION
The treatment of rape victims by the legal system is notorious.
Under the common law rules of evidence, this treatment included
the airing of the victim's sexual history at trial.2 Is evidence of the
sexual history of a rape victim relevant? Is such evidence relevant
to a supposed character trait of unchastity, a propensity defined as
routine consent to sexual relations? 3 Is the victim's sexual history a
general reflection of her character for truthfulness, and thus her
credibility as a witness? The common law has historically answered
all these questions in the strong affirmative.' Victims of sexual
crimes were forced to answer intrusive and intensely embarrassing
questions, often put forth by the defendant in a manner meant to
demean and humiliate. Evidence of the victim's sexual history has
been deemed to be relevant to her credibility and to a supposed
character trait of unchastity, which was in turn relevant to whether
or not she consented to the sexual act in question.5 Furthermore,
defendants utilized the evidence to humiliate and embarrass the vic-
tim, contorting the focus of the trial into a judgment upon her sexual
history, thereby prejudicing the jury.6
The legal system has not been the only agent of the rape victim's
mistreatment. Throughout society, the rape victim has been disbe-
lieved, mistrusted, and shamed, often by those with authority who
1. Gore v. Curtis, 81 Me. 403, 405, 17 A. 314, 315 (1889).
2. See Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Vctms in the State and Federal Courts:
A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MInN. L. Rnv. 763, 765-66 (1986).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 787.
6. See generally Carol DiBattiste, Federal and Military Rape Shield Rules: Are
They Serving Their Purpose?, 37 NAVAL L. REv. 123,127-29 (1980); Katherine Cat-
ton, Evidence Regarding the Prior Sexual History of an Alleged Rape Victim-Its
Effect on the Perceived Guilt of the Accused, 33 U. ToRoNTo FAC. L Rnv. 165,168-
69 (1975); Vivian Berger, Man's TriaL Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLum. L REv. 1, 12-15 (1977). For purposes of simplicity, the Au-
thor will refer to victims as female, while recognizing that victims of sexual crimes
can also be male. The complainant will be referred to as the "victim" and the crime
charged as an "assault," rather than the "alleged victim" and the "alleged assault."
The term "sexual crimes" is meant to cover only the crimes of rape and sexual as-
sault, and lesser related offenses.
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should have aided the victim, specifically, police, doctors, and law-
yers. Victims have been deterred from reporting
because of the shame of public exposure, because of that com-
plex double standard that makes a female feel culpable, even
responsible, for any act of sexual aggression committed against
her ... and because women have been presented with suffi-
cient evidence to come to the realistic conclusion that their
accounts are received with a harsh cynicism that forms the first
line of male defense.7
Abuses of the victim, both inside and outside of the courtroom,
led to a nationwide rape law reform movement in the late 1960s and
the 1970s.s One important result of this reform movement was the
enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 412,1 often termed the "rape
shield" rule, which limited the admission of the victim's sexual his-
tory. Today, forty-nine states have rape shield rules.10 The rules
limit the forms and purposes of admission of evidence of the victim's
sexual past." The justifications for the rape shield rules are varied,
and include the protection of the victim's right to privacy, the pre-
vention of the misuse and exploitation of the victim's sexual history,
and the exclusion of irrelevant evidence. The last of these justifica-
tions, the exclusion of irrelevant evidence, probably the most easily
defensible and the most compelling, has rarely been asserted; rape
shield rules are most often advanced as policy measures.
The rape shield rules have been repeatedly challenged as uncon-
stitutional both on their faces and as applied.' 2 The resolution of
7. SusAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WI= MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 387
(1975).
8. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 791.
9. Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046
(1978) (codified as amended 1988) [hereinafter Privacy Protection for Rape Victims
Act].
10. See Diane Obritsch, Utah Adopts Rule of Evidence 412: Prohibiting Public
Exposure of a Victim's Sexual Past, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 96, 96 (1995).
11. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 773-76.
12. See infra Part III, Section D for a discussion of various cases. See United
States v. Begay, 937 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1991) (upholding exclusion of evidence
under federal rape shield statute); United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir.
1991) (upholding exclusion of child victim's sexual past); United States v. Azure, 845
F.2d 1503 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding exclusion of victim's sexual history when of-
fered to impeach); United States v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming
exclusion of child victim's prior allegations of sexual abuses); Doe v. United States,
666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981) (overturning the exclusion of the victim's sexual history
under federal rape shield rule); Latzer v. Abrams, 602 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (finding constitutional error in the trial court's exclusion of evidence pre-
cluded by the New York rape shield rule); Logan v. Marshall, 540 F. Supp. 3 (N.D.
Ohio 1981) (upholding exclusion of evidence under Ohio rape shield rule); Darrow
v. State, 451 So. 2d 394 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that the Alabama rape
shield statute did not violate equal protection doctrine); People v. Williams, 289
N.W.2d 863 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (reversing trial court exclusion of evidence that
victim was prostitute); State v. Jalo, 557 P.2d 1359 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (reversing
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these challenges has turned on the justification for the rules. Chal-
lengers have argued that the exclusion of evidence of the victim's
sexual history eclipses the constitutional rights of the defendant to
confront adverse witnesses and to obtain compulsory process, an as-
pect of which is the defendant's right to present his best defense
through the introduction of relevant evidence.13 Although rape
shield rules have been challenged as facially unconstitutional on
many occasions, they "have almost [been] universally upheld." 4 In
many instances, however, the application of the rules in particular
cases has been deemed unconstitutional.5
This Comment will discuss the purposes of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 412 and its counterpart in the State of Maine, Maine Rule of
Evidence 412.16 It will address the implications of the Rule's justifi-
cations as policy measures, the validity of the Federal Rule's excep-
tion requiring evidence to be admitted if exclusion would violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant, and the logic and desirability
of applying a rape shield rule to civil cases. Part II of this Comment
is a brief historical survey of the notions of the trinity of women,
chastity, and rape, which provides the basis for an understanding of
why evidence of a victim's sexual history was admissible. Part 1I
analyzes the enactment and application of the Maine Rule and pro-
vides a brief comparison of the Maine Rule to the Federal Rule.
Part IV of this Comment examines the disagreement between Con-
gress and the Supreme Court regarding the 1994 amendments to the
Federal Rule, the major thrust of which was to extend the Rule's
application to civil cases, thereby creating a sexual harassment
trial court exclusion of victim's sexual history when offered as relevant to her motive
to fabricate the charge). See generally Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutionality
of "Rape Shield" Statutes Restricting Use of Evidence of Vctim's Sexual Experiences,
1 A.L.R. 4th 283 (1980) (outlining cases challenging state and federal rape shield
rules). The Supreme Court has never ruled on the general constitutionality of a rape
shield rule, see Galvin, supra note 2, at 772, although the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981), found the exclusion of
evidence by the federal rape shield statute to be unconstitutional. The only
Supreme Court case to judge the constitutionality of an exclusion under a state rape
shield statute was Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991), in which the Court de-
cided that the Michigan rape shield law, which allowed the trial court to exclude
evidence solely because the notice requirement of the rule had not been met, was
not per se unconstitutional. The Court held that a state rape shield notice require-
ment may exclude "evidence of a prior sexual relationship between a rape victim
and a criminal defendant" and remain constitutional. Id. at 151.
13. See generally David Haxton, Comment, Rape Shield Statutes. Constitutional
Despite Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 Wts. L. R-v. 1219, 1255-56
(1985).
14. Galvin, supra note 2, at 772. See Smith, supra note 12, § 6, at 292-300.
15. See Smith, supra note 12, § 6(b), at 300-01.
16. ME R EviD. 412.
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shield.17 The Comment closes with the suggestion that the State of
Maine adopt a sexual harassment shield, although in a format sub-
stantially different from that of the Federal Rule.
The Author concludes that rape shield rules, even as currently for-
mulated, are valid and worthwhile measures. Nevertheless, a discus-
sion regarding the relevance of the evidence excluded by the rape
shield rules would reveal relevance justifications for the Rules ig-
nored by the Rules' drafters. After exploring the application of the
Federal Rule to civil cases, the Author proposes that the extension
of the Rule to civil matters is just and beneficial. Woven throughout
the Comment are the overriding questions of whether evidence of
the victim's sexual past is actually relevant to any defense asserted
and why these issues are rarely considered in terms of relevance
rather than policy and privilege.
II. IMPETUS FOR AND ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE RAPE LAW
REFORM MOVEMENT
A. A Brief Explanation of Societal and Legal Conceptions
of Rape
A woman ought to be quiet, because Adam was formed first
and Eve afterwards, and it was not Adam who was led astray
but the woman who was led astray and fell into sin. Neverthe-
less, she will be saved by child-bearing, provided she lives a
sensible life and is constant in faith and love and holiness.18
1. Society's Historical Conceptions of Rape
In the Victorian era, people believed that sexual intercourse was0
"an essentially painful encounter for an essentially passive wo-
man." 19 Upon this belief was built a network of "social incentives
that will lead women to engage in the procreative act; e.g., a cultural
apparatus that esteems motherhood and an economic system that
makes female survival dependent upon an alliance with some
male. ' 20 Women were deemed to be property, belonging to their
fathers or their husbands.21 Their chastity was their most honored
virtue. Viewed within these societal constructs, "rape meant simply
and conclusively the theft of a father's daughter's virginity, a special-
ized crime that damaged valuable goods before they could reach the
matrimonial market."'  Rape, in addition to being a violent viola-
17. Maine's Criminal and Civil Rules Committee has recently decided to extend
Maine Rule of Evidence 412 to civil cases.
18. Timothy 2:15 (The New Jerusalem Bible).
19. BROWNMnZ.LR, supra note 7, at 316.
20. 23 CHARLEs ALAN WRIrHT & KENNm-H W. GRAHAM, JR., FnEIsAL PRAc-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 5382, at 513 (1980).
21. See id.
22. BROWNmILLER, supra note 7, at 376.
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tion of the female victim, was "a crime against the man who has a
property interest in [a woman's] 'chastity' or in her offspring."2
Prevalent was a paranoia of false rape claims, which contributed
to societal conceptions of rape as well as rape laws.24 In an oft-
quoted statement of the mid 17th-century, Sir Matthew Hale, Lord
Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, pronounced that rape
was an "accu[s]ation ea[s]ily to be made and hard to be proved, and
harder to be defended by the party accu[s]ed, tho never [s]o inno-
cent." John Wigmore, a leading scholar on evidence, hypothesized
that women were prone to rape fantasies, and contended that any
rape victim's claim should be carefully scrutinized. 5 He explained:
Modem psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of er-
rant young girls and women coming before the courts in all
sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are multifarious, dis-
torted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derange-
ments or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment,
partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions.
23. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 20, § 5382, at 514. The laws of rape also
reflected racism and classism. The rape of black female slaves during the era of
slavery was common-the legal system condoned these rapes by refusing to recog-
nize them as illegal. See Jennifer Wriggins, Note, Rape; Racrsn, and the Law, 6
HARV. WoMEN's LJ. 103, 118 (1983). One court went so far as to assume that
"most young white women are virgins, that most young Black women are not, and
that unchaste women are immoral." Id. at 121 (referring to Dallas v. State, 79 So.
690, 691 (Fla. 1918)). In fact, "the association of Black women with unchastity
meant not only that Black women could not be victims of statutory rape, but also
that they would not be recognized as victims of forcible rape." Id. Thus the obsta-
cles faced by white victims were magnified for black victims by a legal and societal
system that compounded sexist notions of a woman's sexual rights with racist no-
tions of a black woman's lack of sexual rights. The Author recognizes that race and
class issues permeate societal views of chastity and the consequences of rape, but a
thorough discussion of those issues is beyond the scope of this Comment.
24. As of 1974, the Canadian Criminal Code still required a cautionary jury in-
struction that a rape allegation could be completely false. See Barbara Findlay, The
Cultural Context of Rape, 60 WomEN LAw. J. 199, 205 (1974).
25. 1 MATrHEw HALE, THE HISmORY OF T-m PLEAS OF Tm CROWN 635, (P.R.
Glazebook ed., 1971) (1736). Any female victim's testimony was to be carefully
scrutinized with distrust, "based on the cherished male assumption that female per-
sons tend to lie." BRovamLt.ER, supra note 7, at 369. The fear was extreme, as
revealed by the statement of one court that "[t]here is no class of prosecutions at-
tended with so much danger, or which afford so ample an opportunity for the free
play of malice and private vengeance. In such cases the accused Is almost defenseless
.... " People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 223-24 (Cal. 1856) (emphasis added). One
feminist noted:
Fear of false accusation is not entirely without merit in any criminal case,
... but the irony, of course, is that while men successfully convinced each
other and us that women cry rape with ease and glee, the reality of rape is
that victimized women have always been reluctant to report the crime and
seek legal justice ....
BROWNMLLER, supra note 7, at 387.
26. 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, NVIGMORE AND EvDENCE, § 924a, at 736-37
(James H. Chadbourn ed., 1970).
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One form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false
charges of sexual offenses by men. The unchaste (let us call it)
mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the narration
of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine
or the victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward
and convincing. The real victim, however, too often in such
cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy natu-
rally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give
easy credit to such a plausible tale.
27 -
2. The Effect of Societal Notions on the Substantive and
Evidentiary Laws of Rape
Societal conceptions naturally, if unfairly, shaped the substantive
and evidentiary laws of rape. 8 For example, many state rape stat-
utes required the victim to corroborate her claim.29 The rapes of
wives by their husbands were not recognized, lack of consent had to
be manifested through vigorous physical resistance, and only the ex-
treme examples of sexual assault were recognized under the legal
definitions of rape. Because of the perceived danger of fabricated
claims and the "male distrust of female witnesses,"' the defendant's
cross-examination of the victim was considered especially important
in rape trials. The defendant was allowed to delve fully into the
27. Id. at 736 (emphasis added).
28. The traditional elements of rape were: carnal knowledge was obtained by a
man of a woman outside of marriage, the act had occurred with force, and the act
was against the victim's will. See State v. DiPietrantonio, 152 Me. 41, 46, 122 A.2d
414,417 (1956). The crime of rape has been unique among crimes. Often the victim
seemed on trial, special character rules applied, and the victim could be
referred to as having been despoiled, as if she has in some sense been con-
taminated by her experience ... [and] the victim is called the complainant
or prosecutrix, as if she only were complaining about her experience and
were out to avenge a personal wrong, while other crimes are regarded as
crimes against society.
Catton, supra note 6, at 165 (quoting Neil Brooks, Address at Women and Law
Conference (Sept. 13 & 14, 1974)).
29. See BROWNMnILER, supra note 7, at 371-72. The common law did not strictly
require corroboration; nevertheless, the victim's failure to have complained to
others at or near the time of the rape was usually noted to discredit her testimony.
See TreAt. EVIDENCE: THE CHAMBERLAYNE HANDBOOK § 1133, at 1142 (Leslie J.
Tompkins ed., 2d ed. 1936) [hereinafter CHAmERLAYNE]. Even when a rape stat-
ute did not require corroboration, prosecutors were often reluctant to bring rape
claims-that did not have strong corroborating evidence, because they knew that the
strict scrutiny afforded a rape victim's claims might render the victim's testimony
insufficient to sustain a conviction. Furthermore, even if the victim did complain to
someone at or near the time of the rape, such testimony was only grudgingly admit-
ted: "It is, of course, self-serving, but the fact that she is a female, and naturally
reticent as to matters of that kind, plus the necessity of some corroborating circum-
stance to secure a conviction, have been deemed sufficient reasons for admitting it."
Id. § 627 at 1144.
30. 23 WIoUrr & GRAHAM, supra note 20, § 5382, at 509.
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victim's past, including her sexual history," and he was allowed to
thoroughly interrogate the victim.'
3. The Common Law Rules of Evidence Regarding the Victim's
Sexual History
Under the common law, character evidence was generally inad-
missible. 3 In criminal cases, the victim's character was admissible
as an exception to the general bar on character evidence in two in-
stances, 4 one of which was that character evidence was allowed
when the defendant was charged with forcible rape.35 TWo ratio-
nales existed under the common law for admitting evidence of the
victim's sexual past. One rationale was that the victim's sexual his-
tory was a relevant character trait. The other justification was that
the victim's sexual past was relevant to the credibility of the victim.
31. See DiBattiste, supra note 6, at 127.
32. See People v. Degnen, 234 P. 129,138 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1925). A standard
defense against rape claims was that the victim was promiscuous. A promiscuous
victim was less valuable as a property interest, and was also disesteemed by the jury.
See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 20, § 5382, at 514-15. I~vo other standard
defenses were that the victim was not a "normal" woman and she chose to have sex,
or that the victim was a prostitute, and therefore the crime was not rape but rather
theft. Id. at 514. All of these were the standard defenses if the defendant admitted
that the sexual act had happened, but contended there were extenuating circum-
stances. The victim's sexual past could be brought in as relevant to any of these
defenses. Even when defenses which did not include an admission that the sexual
act occurred were asserted, "courts admitted evidence of unchastity [when the de-
fense was] mistaken identity or denial of sexual intercourse." Galvin, supra note 2,
at 784.
33. Character evidence was generally considered irrelevant. See Galvin, supra
note 2, at 778. The unchastity of the victim in rape cases was an exception. See Id. at
783. Reasons for the general exclusion of character evidence include the following:
there is no concrete definition of character, character evidence allows the jury to
make moral judgments about the worth of the person, and such evidence has the
ability to delay and confuse the jury with collateral issues. See id. at 778-79. When
character is admissible, it can theoretically be proven by evidence consisting of testi-
mony as to the person's reputation, testimony of another witness's opinion of that
person's character, or evidence of specific actions taken by the person. The Federal
Rules of Evidence allow character to be proved by reputation or opinion evidence.
See FED. R. Evm. 405(b). They also allow proof by specific instances of conduct in
cases in which character is an "essential element of a charge, claim, or defense" or
on cross-examination. Id. In most jurisdictions, proof of the victim's sexual history
could be made only by common reputation. See CHAzwu.A'RN supra note 29,
§ 627, at 598. Some jurisdictions, however, allowed proof to be made by detailing
specific acts of the victim. See id at 599.
34. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 782.
35. See id. at 783. The other exception to the inadmissibility of character evi-
dence was when a defendant accused of homicide claimed he was acting in self-
defense; in that instance, the victim's character for violence was deemed relevant.
See id. at 782. This exception required the defendant to raise a particular defense,
self-defense. See id. The rape defendant exception, on the other hand, applied no
matter what defense was raised. See id. at 783.
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In rape cases, the victim's sexual history purportedly revealed
whether she had a supposed character trait of unchasteness, which
in turn was relevant to the issue of whether she consented. Consent
was inferred from evidence of prior unchastity.36 The rationale was
that it was "more probable that an unchaste woman would assent to
such an act."37 A typical jury instruction read:
"Evidence was received for the purpose of showing that the
female person ... was a woman of unchaste character. A wo-
man of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible rape
but it may be inferred that a woman who has previously con-
sented to sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent
again."
38
The second justification for the admission of the victim's sexual
history was that it was relevant to her character trait of truthfulness.
In general, the character of a witness was perceived as relevant to
her credibility. However, such character evidence was limited to the
victim's trait of truthfulness. 39 Nevertheless, some jurisdictions held
that the victim's character trait of unchastity was relevant to her
trait of truthfulness when the charge was a sexual crime.40 The law
deemed that "promiscuity imports dishonesty," where the female
victim was concerned. 4 The reasoning was that:
"[I]f the victim admits some form of previous sexual conduct it
can be inferred that she is a woman of bad moral character. If
she is an immoral person, then it can be inferred further that
she is a person who would not have conscientious scruples
about lying on the witness stand.... [I]f a woman consents to
sexual intercourse outside of marriage then she is a person
who would also lie." 42
Thus, the general rule regarding character evidence was interpreted
expansively in the case of rape victims. Their character of truthful-
ness, relevant to their credibility, could be proven by the introduc-
tion of evidence of their character of unchastity.
36. See id.
37. People v. Collins, 186 N.E2d 30, 33 (Il. 1962).
38. Edwinna G. Johnson, Note, Evidence-Rape Trials-Victim's Prior Sexual
History, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 362, 368 n32 (1975) (quoting COMMrrrME ON STAN-
DARD JURY INSTRUCrIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANOELES
COUNTY, CALIFORIA JURY INSTRUCriONS, CRIMINAL, § 10.06, at 327 (3d rev. ed.
1970)).
39. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 787.
40. See id.
41. See Berger, supra note 6, at 16 (citing Brown v. State, 280 So. 2d 177, 179
(Ala. App. 1973)). This inference was not permissible with regard to males, nor was
it applicable to female witnesses in any context other than sexual crimes. See Gal-
vin, supra note 2, at 787.
42. Catton, supra note 6, at 166-67 (quoting Neil Brooks, Address at Women and
Law Conference (Sept. 13 & 14, 1974)).
[Vol. 49:443
PROTECTI7VG THE VICTIM
B. Aspects of the Movement to Reform Rape Laws
1. Criticisms of Rape Statutes and Common Law Rules
During the 1970s, the women's movement successfully called for
an overhaul of rape laws and rules. Proof was advanced that "suspi-
cion and hostility toward the rape complainant affected not only the
legal rules applied to rape but also the discretionary, less visible as-
pects of the criminal justice system."43 Victims were revictimized in
the courtroom, and disbelieved at the police station and in the doc-
tor's office.44 Reformists argued that rape laws no longer accurately
reflected societal sexual norms, and that the assumptions embodied
in the law were no longer valid.45 The discredited "property value"
rationale, which remained embedded in the policies behind the
rules, was criticized. 6 The fear of false rape claims, motivational to
those creating and upholding rape laws, was decried.47
Furthermore, rape was one of the most underreported violent
crimes and had a relatively low rate of conviction 8 As few as two
out of every seven rapes were reported.4 9 In addition, "once a rape
had been reported, there was almost a fifty percent chance that the
perpetrator would not be caught."50 Only sixty percent of adults
arrested for rape were charged.51 Of the sixty percent charged, al-
most fifty percent were acquitted or had the charge dismissed.5
The rules of evidence admitting the victim's sexual history were
strongly criticized during the reform movement.5 3 Both of the com-
43. Galvin, supra note 2, at 793.
44. Seeid.
45. Seb id. at 798.
46. See BRowwNlI.EP, supra note 7, at 379.
47. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 792-93.
48. See Berger, supra note 6, at 5-6. Some commentators argued that u[tlhe rhet-
oric used to support the bill was a combination of feminist concern for the fate of the
victim in a male-dominated legal system and conservative 'law-and-order' arguments
that the existing system permitted criminals to escape by discouraging their victims
from reporting the crime." 23 WRIGHT & GRMA, supra note 20, § 5382, at 493-94
(footnotes omitted).
49. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 795 n.151. The vigorous and humiliating cross-
examination of the victim was often cited as a reason for her failure to come forward
or her failure to cooperate with law enforcement, but some scholars were skeptical:
"[G]ood evidence of the extent of abuse is difficult to come by." 23 WjuOwr &
GRAHAm, supra note 20, § 5382 at 496. Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation reported that "underreporting of rape 'is due primarily to the victims' fear
of their assailants and their sense of embarrassment over the incident.'" Id. at 499-
500 (quoting 1977 FBI, UrNoRhi Cmm RE'. FOR THE U.S. 14 (1977)).
50. Berger, supra note 6, at 6 (citing 1974 FBI, UNEtobiu CRiME REP. FOR TE
U.S. 24 (1974)).
51. See i. (citing 1974 FBI, UrnoRM CRmie REP. FOR "m U.S. 24 (1974)).
52. See i& (citing 1974 FBI, UNIFoRi CRIME REP. FOR m U.S. 24 (1974)).
53. Some saw this part of the women's movement to be mainly "symbolic," and
have attributed the hindered application of the Rule to this fact, stating that "[ilt is
not surprising that some male judges and lawyers find it easy to dismiss such symbol-
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mon law justifications for admitting the evidence were challenged. 4
The rationale that chastity was relevant to the victim's consent was
contradicted by evidence that engaging in sexual activity before
marriage was within the conventional norms of behavior, and not a
character flaw.5 Once prior sexual activity was no longer classified
as a character flaw embodied in a trait of unchastity, then "the mere
fact that the complainant [had] previously engaged in consensual
sexual activity [afforded] no basis for inferring consent on a later
occasion. ''" 6 The second rationale, that the evidence was relevant to
the victim's character for truthfulness, did not withstand scrutiny
either. Empirical research suggested that a woman's sexual history
was unrelated to her propensity to lie on the witness stand.5 7
Critics decried the defendant's use of the victim's sexual past as a
harassment device during cross-examination of the victim as outra-
geous and unacceptable.5 Unnecessarily vicious and humiliating
cross-examination "resulted in nothing less than character-assassina-
tion in open court."5 9 Consequently, rules of evidence were pro-
posed to protect victims from harassment on the stand and to limit
the introduction of evidence of the victim's sexual history.60
2. Exposure of Juries' Rationales
Reformists also criticized the manipulation of juries with evidence
of the victim's sexual history. Rape ranked second in crimes in
which defendants chose a jury trial over a bench trial.61 Juries, usu-
ally male-dominated, were reluctant to convict; to a rape defendant,
"the jury [was] an ally, not an enemy."62 In addition, jurors misused
ism with a baffled resentment." 23 WIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 20, § 5382, at
508.
54. It was suggested that the "changing moral climate in this country simply in-
validated the underpinnings of the common-law doctrine, rendering unchastity evi-
dence irrelevant for its stated purposes." Galvin, supra note 2, at 798.
55. See id. at 798-99.
56. Id. at 799.
57. See Catton, supra note 6, at 167 (citing W. MiscimL, PERsoNALrrY AND As-
snssmENrr 26 (1968)). Reformists charged that both of the permissible forms of
proof of the victim's sexual history were unreliable. Reputation evidence, as com-
pared with other forms of proof, was argued to be "especially unreliable and preju-
dicial when it relates to sexual matters .... [Tihe complainant's reputation for
'unchastity' tends to be little more than speculation and exaggeration." Galvin,
supra note 2, at 801. On the other hand, proof by specific acts could create "unfair
prejudice and undue consumption of time in proving a sufficient number of in-
stances." Id. at 781.
58. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 794-95.
59. Id. at 794.
60. See generally id. at 791-801 (criticizing original Federal Rule of Evidence
412).
61. See BROWNMLLER, supra note 7, at 373.
62. Id. (quoting Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, Address at the meeting of the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York (Jan. 16, 1974)).
[Vol. 49:443
PROTECTING THE VICTIM
evidence of the victim's sexual history. When the victim was merely
asked questions about her sexual past, even when the allegations
were denied or the questions stricken, the jurors' perception of the
defendant's guilt waned.63
Worse still, in a famous study of jurors, researchers Harry Kalven,
Jr., and Hans Zeisel, found that jurors were "rewriting the law of
rape."' The jury "closely, and often harshly, scrutinizes the female
complainant and is moved to be lenient with the defendant when-
ever there are suggestions of contributory behavior on her part."'
The jury felt "not so much that involuntary intercourse under these
circumstances is no crime at all, but rather that it does not have the
gravity of rape." 66 In cases of "simple rape," the jury convicted only
three out of forty-two times.67 The judge, however, would have con-
victed twenty-two out of those forty-two times.'
3. The Advent of Reform
The rape reform efforts were successful in achieving changes in
both substantive and evidentiary rules of rape law.69 Many states
removed corroboration as a requirement, sexual assaults were rec-
63. See id. at 374. Jurors often made the unacceptable conclusion that "un-
chaste" women were not worthy of the protection of the law, whether their claims
were believed or not. Researchers found that
jurors use evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, not on the issues of cred-
ibility or consent as the law of evidence requires, but rather to determine
whether the victim is a "good" woman deserving of protection or a "bad"
woman who by her prior flouting of sexual mores has forfeited her right to
protection and is therefore a justifiable target for aggressive male sexual
impulses.
23 WR'rGRT & GRAHAM, supra note 20, § 5382, at 514-15 (footnotes omitted).
64. HAR Yt KALEN, JR. & HANs ZEIsEL., THE AbwmucAN Juty 251 (1966).
65. Id. at 249. Contributory behavior, for example, might consist of consuming
alcohol, voluntarily being alone with a stranger, or spending time with an estranged
husband. See id. at 250.
66. Id. at 251.
67. See id. at 253. "Simple rape" is defined as rape without any aggravating fac-
tors, which could include extrinsic violence, more than one assailant, or the fact that
the victim and the defendant were complete strangers at the time of the rape. See id.
at 252.
68. See id. at 254.
69. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 768 n.17. At about the same time, the original
body of the Federal Rules of Evidence was evolving. Although none of the original
Rules, enacted in 1975, affected the common law rules of admissibility of a rape
victim's sexual past, the Rules codified a standard of relevance. Relevant evidence
is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." FED. R. Evw. 401. Rule 402 states the concept
that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible" without exception. FED. R.
EvD. 402. The opposite is not always true, however, because "[a]ll relevant evi-
dence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." Id.
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ognized in a broader sense than the specific act of rape, and gender
neutral language was employed in sexual assault laws.70 Further-
more, the requirement that the victim resist was abolished in most
states, and sentencing for rape convictions became more flexible be-
cause many juries refused to convict because of the stiff sentences
for rape convictions.71 Finally, reform advocates were successful in
advocating for rape shield rules; by 1980, almost every state, as well
as the federal system, had enacted a rape shield rule.'
Rape shield statutes took their form as rules of evidence,73 appli-
cable in rape and sexual assault criminal cases, limiting the admissi-
bility of evidence of the victim's sexual history.74 This Comment
analyzes the original Federal Rule in Part III. Part IV will discuss
Maine's Rule 412. The revised Federal Rule will be evaluated in
Part V. Each rape shield rule's primary purpose, articulated mainly
in the Advisory Committee's Notes and in court interpretations, is
protecting victims from unfair uses of evidence of their sexual his-
tory. The poor treatment of victims by law enforcement, the legal
system, and society in general easily justified the Rules' protection
of rape and sexual assault victims. In this articulation of policy, the
probative value of the victim's past sexual behavior was rarely dis-
cussed, and the Rules were thus not framed in terms of relevance.
This Comment will continue to reflect on the repercussions of justi-
fying rape shields as rules of policy and privilege.
70. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 768-70.
71. See id. at 768-69.
72. The common law rules of evidence, specifically pertaining to the use of the
victim's sexual history, were used in federal courts until 1978, when Federal Rule of
Evidence 412 was enacted, rejecting the common law rules and rationales regarding
the victim's sexual history. See supra Part JI, Section A, Subsection 3.
73. Some analysts have questioned how the women's movement was able to "or-
ganize a political movement around a technical rule of evidence, even one as in-
defensible as the common law rule on the use of the sexual history of a rape victim."
23 WIGrr & GRAH", supra note 20, § 5382, at 508. Those same analysts had
difficulty discerning the motivation of the reformists: "Self-interest, the usual expla-
nation for political movements, is difficult to trace since the feminist movement ap-
pears, by and large, to be made up of that class of women who are least likely to
become rape victims." Id. at 508 n.78.
74. There were four basic types of rape shield rules, termed the Michigan, Texas,
California, and federal approaches. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 773. The Michigan
approach, the most restrictive in admitting evidence of the victim's sexual past, pro-
hibited introduction of the evidence subject to highly specific exceptions; twenty-five
states now have this type of rule, see id, including Maine. See id. at 906 app. tbl. 1.
Under the Texas approach, trial courts wielded discretion to admit such evidence
based on traditional relevancy evaluations. See id. at 774. The California approach
separated evidence into one of two categories, depending upon whether it was being
offered as substantive evidence, or as relevant to the victim's credibility. See id. at
775. Finally, the federal approach excluded evidence of the victim's sexual history
with certain exceptions, including a catchall exception for evidence constitutionally
required to be admitted. See id.
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m. Tim ORImNa. FEDERAL RAPE SHIELD RuLz
A. Original Federal Rule of Evidence 412
1. The Process of Enactment
In 1978, the Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act was enacted
by the United States Congress.75 The Act created Federal Rule of
Evidence 412,76 limiting the admission of the victim's sexual history
in rape or sexual assault cases 7 The Rule had three purposes: to
protect rape victims; to encourage reporting of rapes and foster vic-
tim cooperation with police and prosecutors; and to serve as a
75. Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, supra note 9.
76. The text of the Rule was as follows, in part:
RULE 412. RAPE CASES; RELEVANCE OF VICIIM'S PAST
BEHAVIOR
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which
a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, reputa-
tion or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of
such rape or assault is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which
a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, evi-
dence of a victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion
evidence is also not admissible, unless such evidence other than reputation
or opinion evidence is-
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2) and
is constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence
of-:-
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the ac-
cused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether
the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged
victim, the source of semen or injury, or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered
by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged vic-
tim consented to the sexual behavior with respect to
which rape or assault is alleged.
(c)(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in the
paragraph (2) that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant
and that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of un-
fair prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible in the trial to the extent an
order made by the court specifies evidence which may be offered and areas
with respect to which the alleged victim may be examined or cross-
examined.
Id. Minor amendments were enacted in 1988 which expanded the set of crimes
under which Rule 412 was triggered. "Rape" and "assault" were replaced with "sex
offense" and "offense under Chapter 109A of Title 18, U.S.C." FED. R. Evm. 412.
Chapter 109A of Title 18 includes the crimes of sexual abuse, aggravated sexual
abuse, abusive sexual contact, and sexual abuse of a minor or ward. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-45 (1994).
77. See Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, supra note 9. The bill had more
than one hundred cosponsors, but the principal sponsor was Representative Eliza-
beth Holtzman (D-NY). See 124 CONG. Rc. 34,913 (1978).
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model for over twenty states which had not yet passed rape shield
statutes.
78
2. Explanation of the Rule and Its Effect on Common Law
The Rule created a general bar, with exceptions, to the admission
of the sexual history of a rape victim. It applied only to the crimes
of rape and assault with intent to commit rape.79 It excluded all
reputation and opinion evidence as proof of the victim's sexual his-
tory, but allowed specific acts as proof if they fell into any of three
categories: the victim's past sexual behavior with others offered to
show that the defendant was not the source of injury or semen; the
victim's past sexual behavior with the defendant to show that the
victim consented to the alleged assault; and evidence constitution-
ally required to be admitted.80 In addition, the Rule created a pro-
cedural mechanism for the introduction of any evidence of sexual
history, including a motion by the proponent and a hearing in cham-
bers.8 ' If the evidence was determined by the judge to be relevant,
he or she employed a balancing test to determine if the evidence
was admissible, admitting the evidence only if the "probative value
of the evidence... outweigh[ed] the danger of unfair prejudice."'
Thus, Rule 412 overturned the common law rule that the victim's
general sexual history was admissible as relevant to her character of
truthfulness or to the substantive issue of lack of consent. 83 More-
over, whereas under the common law the only admissible forms of
evidence were reputation or opinion evidence, the Rule allowed
only specific acts.
Because the Rule was passed by Congress, and was not promul-
gated by the Supreme Court via the Judicial Conference mecha-
nisms, no Advisory Committee's Note accompanied the Rule.'
78. See DiBattiste, supra note 6, at 130.
79. See Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, supra note 9.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id
83. Id Although the Rule admitted the victim's history with the defendant as
relevant to consent, it did not allow the victim's sexual history with others as relevant
to the victim's consent with the defendant.
84. The Judicial Conference of the United States has been established to recom-
mend changes and additions to all procedural rules to the Supreme Court. See
RICHARD H. FIELD, ET AL., MATERIAL.S FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
459-60 (6th ed. 1990). In particular, the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evi-
dence, a subcommittee of the Standing Committee of the Rules of Practice & Proce-
dure, is charged with overseeing necessary changes to the Rules of Evidence. See id.
at 20-22. The Judicial Conference makes recommendations to the Supreme Court
which then promulgates a newer amended rule, if it so chooses. See id. at 459-60.
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Although debate on the House and Senate floors was minimal, it
revealed the rationale and motivation behind the new Rule!'
B. The Rationale Behind the Rule
The main rationale advanced for the Rule was the protection of
the victim's privacy; the Act was subtitled: "An Act to amend the
Federal Rules of Evidence to provide for the protection of the pri-
vacy of rape victims."'  The legal system's abuses of the victim pro-
vided ample policy justification for the Rule. Representative James
Mann (D-SC), speaking in the House of Representatives on Octo-
ber 10, 1978, stated that the purpose of the Rule was to prevent
circumstances whereby "[d]efense lawyers were permitted great lati-
tude in bringing out intimate details about a rape victim's life."' s
Such testimony was to be excluded because it served "no real pur-
pose and only [resulted] in embarrassment to the rape victim and
unwarranted public intrusion into her private life." 9
"mhe principal purpose of this legislation is to protect rape vic-
tims from the degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate de-
tails about their private lives," noted Representative Mann.90 The
primary sponsbr of the legislation, Representative Elizabeth Holtz-
man (D-NY), urged support for the bill on the basis that it would
"protect women from both injustice and indignity," by restricting
"the vulnerability of rape victims to such humiliating cross-examina-
tion of their past sexual experiences and intimate personal histo-
ries." 91 When signing the bill, President Carter stated that the bill
was "designed to end the public degradation of rape victims and, by
protecting victims from humiliation, to encourage the reporting of
rape. , g
85. See 2 CHRSToPHER B. MuELLER & AntD C. KiRICAamcK, FEDMAL EV.
DENCE § 155, at 187 (2d ed. 1994).
86. Representative James Mann (D-SC) and Representative Elizabeth Holtzman
(D-NY) repeatedly advocated the Rule as a means of protecting victims' privacy
interests and preventing them unnecessary embarrassment and humiliation. See 124
CONG. Rec. 34,912-13 (1978).
87. Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, supra note 9.
88. 124 CONG. Rc. 34,912 (1978).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 34,913.
91. Id.
92. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 20, § 5382, at 494 (citing 14 Wum.M
COmp. Pans. Doc. 1902 (Oct. 30, 1978)). Note that President Carter recognized the
valid relevance arguments that could be made for the Rule, when he stated: "By
restricting testimony on the victim's prior sexual behavior to that genuinely relevant
to the defense, the rape victim's act will prevent a defendant from making the vic-
tim's private life the issue in the trial." Id. (emphasis added) (citing 14 W\ms y
Com. PREs. Doc. 1902 (Oct. 30, 1978)).
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Congressional supporters of the Rule did not espouse a theory of
relevance on the record. 93 They failed to confront the issue of
whether evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior was even rele-
vant. Nevertheless, there is a strong argument that the Rule merely
excludes irrelevant evidence. Some commentators have argued that
the Rule creates a "new analysis of relevance," based on the fact
that the Rule changed the common law theories of relevance and
"undermined the previously assumed relevance of evidence con-
cerning the victim's chastity." 94 If that is correct, it is not clear that
such a result was intended by the Rule's supporters and drafters.
The Rule, in its language, its accompanying Advisory Committee's
Note, and Congressional debate, is based solely on policy justifica-
tions rather than relevance concerns.
C. Constitutional Issues Surrounding Federal Rule of
Evidence 412
The necessity of the Rule's "constitutionally required" exception
was debated contentiously. 95 Representative Mann noted that the
purpose of the clause was "to cover those infrequent instances
where, because of an unusual chain of circumstances, the general
rule of inadmissibility, if followed, would result in denying the de-
fendant a constitutional right."96 Behind the textual argument lay a
fundamental dissension as to whether the Rule would exclude rele-
vant evidence. Critics of the Rule predicted conflict between the
Rule and the Sixth Amendment guarantees of the defendant's rights
to compulsory process and to confront the witnesses against him.97
The defendant's compulsory process right includes the right to pres-
ent all favorable evidence in defending against the charge, and is
satisfied by the calling of witnesses, through subpoena if necessary. 98
93. The closest a Congressional supporter came to arguing for the Rule on a rele-
vance basis occurred when Representative Mann indicated that evidence of the vic-
tim's past sexual actions "may have at best a tenuous connection" to the crime. 124
CoNG. REc. 34,912 (1978).
94. Jacqueline H. Sloan, Comment, Extending Rape Shield Protection to Sexual
Harassment Actions: New Federal Rule of Evidence 412 Undermines Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 363, 368-69 (1996).
95. Note that if evidence fell under this exception the balancing test was not re-
quired. See FED. R. Evw. 412, Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, supra note
9 (amended 1988). One treatise commentator theorized that the "constitutionally
required" provision was a victory of the "traditional male view of rape," because it
invited "courts to constitutionalize the protections against false accusation." 23
WiGr & GRAHAM, supra note 20, § 5382, at 530.
96. 124 CONG. REc. 34,912 (1978). No further elaboration was given as to what
those circumstances would be.
97. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
98. See Haxton, supra note 13, at 1255.
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Nevertheless, the testimony proferred in support of this right "must
be relevant to the issues in the case."'9 The defendant's right to con-
front witnesses is usually embodied in the defendant's cross-exami-
nation of witnesses. The right allows the defendant to "obtain all
the relevant facts from the witness ... and to elicit answers that
impeach the witness' credibility.""lco
1. Relevant Constitutional Rights and Precedents
The outcome of the Rule's interaction with a defendant's constitu-
tional rights depends upon the purpose of the Rule and the reason
the evidence is being excluded. 01 There are three general reasons
to exclude evidence: the evidence is irrelevant; a policy supports the
exclusion of the evidence;"~ and the evidence is protected by a
privilege.
The exclusion of irrelevant evidence cannot conflict with the de-
fendant's rights of compulsory process or confrontation, because
those rights encompass only relevant evidence. There is "no consti-
tutional right to introduce irrelevant evidence." ' 3 Furthermore,
"[e]ven relevant evidence is not constitutionally required to be ad-
mitted.""° Regarding the defendant's confrontation right, the
Eighth Circuit, citing Supreme Court precedent, has held that there
is no conflict when irrelevant evidence is excluded, because "[t]he
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation... require[s] only that the
accused be permitted to introduce all relevant and admissible evi-
dence."'" 5 In addition, the trial court has the right under Federal
Rule of Evidence 611(a) to impose limits on cross-examination to
"protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." 106
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Most rules of evidence exclude evidence only when offered for a specific
purpose. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 excludes evidence that reme-
dial measures were taken after an accident, if offered "to prove negligence or culpa-
ble conduct in connection with the event." FED. . Evw. 407. The Rule does not,
however exclude such evidence "when offered for another purpose, such as ... im-
peachment." Id. Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 408 excludes evidence of
compromises or offers to compromise when offered to "prove liability." FwM. R.
EviD. 408. The Rule goes on to conclude that it "does not require exclusion when
the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness." Id. Rule 412, on the other hand, excludes evidence "whether offered as
substantive evidence or for impeachment." FED. R. Evw. 412 advisory committee's
note.
102. This Comment includes in the policy category evidence excluded due to fac-
tors of unreliability, for example, rules regarding hearsay and the requirement of
personal knowledge.
103. 2 MuELLER & KuuKPATICK, supra note 85, § 159, at 200.
104. State v. Clarke, 343 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1984).
105. United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 272 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
106. FED. R. EvD. 611(a).
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Moreover, "'[a] defendant does not enjoy unrestricted latitude in
the cross-examination of adverse witnesses. He is limited to issues
relevant to the trial, and it is within the broad discretion of the trial
court to determine which issues are relevant.""' 1 7
If a rule excludes evidence because of policy considerations, its
operation may conflict with a defendant's rights. If a defendant's
compulsory process right is implicated, the court must weigh the de-
fendant's constitutional right against the legitimate interests of the
state or the witness.108 The evidence can be excluded without vio-
lating the defendant's compulsory process right only if the court
finds that the defendant's interests are outweighed by the state's or
witness's interests.1 9
More often, however, the defendant is asserting his right to con-
front witnesses when evidence has been excluded for policy reasons.
The Supreme Court has answered the question of whether the evi-
dence was unconstitutionally excluded differently depending on the
reasons for the exclusion. In Davis v. Alaska,1 0 the Supreme Court
found that the defendant's right to confront a juvenile witness su-
perseded the state's interest in keeping juvenile criminal records
sealed."' But the Court restricted its holding to the facts of the
case, stating that "[i]n this setting we conclude that the right of con-
frontation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting a juvenile
offender." '112 In Olden v. Kentucky," 3 the Court held that the trial
court's exclusion of the victim's personal relationship with her boy-
friend, under a Rule 403 balancing test, was unconstitutional be-
cause it eclipsed the defendant's right to confront the victim-witness
about her motive to fabricate.114 And in Chambers v. Mississippi,115
the Court held that the defendant's right to confront witnesses out-
weighed the state's "voucher rule,"" 6 which prevented the person
calling a witness from treating the witness as a hostile witness."17
Nevertheless, the defendant's constitutional right to confront wit-
107. United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United
States v. Kennedy, 714 F.2d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 1983)).
108. See Haxton, supra note 13, at 1256.
109. See id. Witnesses do "have constitutional rights that can be violated if they
are required to answer every relevant question." Id. A witness's rights at issue
more often involve privacy interests.
110. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
111. See id at 320.
112. Id. at 319.
113. 488 U.S. 227 (1988).
114. See id. at 232-33.
115. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
116. See id at 298.
117. See id. at 296. The Court minimized the state's interest in having a rule
requiring the caller of a witness to vouch for his or her credibility; "[tihe 'voucher'
rule has been condemned as archaic, irrational, and potentially destructive of the
truth-gathering process." Id. at 296 n.8.
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nesses has limitations. In Chambers v. Mississippi, the Court noted
that "[o]f course, the right to confront and to cross-examine is not
absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process."""
A rule may also exclude evidence based on a privilege, which ex-
ists to prevent information from being disclosed regardless of its rel-
evance or trustworthiness; "the effect of a privilege is to suppress
the truth.""' 9 The assertion of a privilege may conflict with the de-
fendant's right to compulsory process. In United States v. Nixon,' °
when this conflict occurred, the Court subverted the privilege in or-
der to preserve the defendant's constitutional right. The Court held
that "[tihe generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal
trial." 2 Regarding a conflict between a privilege and the defend-
ant's confrontation right, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that privileges "can be trumped by constitutional rights, such as
the right of confrontation conferred by the Sixth Amendment and
interpreted to include the right of cross-examination." m
Rule 412, however, has not been established as a privilege, even
though the protection of the victim's privacy rights is often cited as a
motivation for the Rule.3 Most important, the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note does not explore the relevance justification for the Rule.
The Rule is based on a "strong social policy in not only punishing
those who engage in sexual misconduct, but in also providing relief
to the victim.' -4 Interestingly, Rule 412 excludes evidence even
when offered for the purposes of impeachment. Because the Rule
118. Id. at 295. In United States v. Barrett, 766 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1985), the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court "has the discretion to limit cross-
examination once the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to establish the potential
bias of the [witness] has been satisfied." Id. at 614.
119. 1 MfcHAE. H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK oF FEDERAL EvmE~cE § 501.1, at
507 (4th ed. 1996).
120. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
121. Id. at 713.
122. United States v. Rainone, 32 F.3d 1203, 1206 (7th Cir. 1994). One related
issue which the Supreme Court has ruled on is the constitutionality of excluding
testimony as a sanction for discovery violations. In Taylor v. ilinols, 484 U.S. 400
(1988), the defendant argued that such an exclusion violated his Sixth Amendment
rights to compulsory process. See id. at 402. The Supreme Court held that "such a
sanction is not absolutely prohibited by the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment." Id.
123. Commentators have argued that protecting victim-witnesses does not always
ally with the interests of the prosecutor, and that the Rule ought therefore to be cast
directly as a privilege. See 23 WRiGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 20, § 5382, at 523-24.
Nevertheless, the Rule can be contrasted with an evidentiary privilege, "the invoca-
tion of which frequently results in the loss of highly relevant evidence in the interest
of furthering policies extrinsic to the fact-finding process." Galvin, supra note 2, at
887.
124. 1 GRAHAM, supra note 119, § 412.1, at 480.
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excludes evidence based on a policy of protection, it has been fre-
quently challenged as violating the defendant's constitutional rights
to compulsory process and confrontation of witnesses. 115
If the Rule were enunciated and justified as a rule of relevance,
then the cloudy constitutional issues would become clearer. All evi-
dence of a victim's sexual past is not necessarily irrelevant. How-
ever, a relevance analysis would allow the exclusion of evidence
which is irrelevant on that basis alone; such evidence is now ex-
cluded solely on the basis of policy. Furthermore, if the evidence is
relevant, the trial court should weigh the defendant's right against
the state's interest in excluding the evidence or the witness's privacy
interest. The trial court should not immediately admit the evidence
because the exclusion was based on a rule of policy, and assume that
the Rule is therefore automatically trumped by the defendant's con-
stitutional rights. The policy justifications for the Rule continue to
be constitutionally challenged, thereby eclipsing the more justifiable
and obvious rationale for the Rule. Furthermore, the stereotypical
thinking that such evidence was relevant to the victim's credibility
and the issue of consent under the common law needs to be fully
confronted and reevaluated. By failing to analyze the relevance of
the victim's sexual history, the drafters shortchanged the Rule, as
well as sexual crime victims.
The constitutional arguments portray the dual thought processes
behind the Rule and the importance of determining its most legiti-
mate rationale. Even if evidence is relevant, the state's interest can
override the defendant's constitutional right, and the evidence can
be constitutionally excluded. The state's interest, however, remains
unclear, at least until the rationalization for the Rule is clarified.
The evidence excluded by Rule 412 is often irrelevant, in which
case no constitutional conflict exists, because the defendant has no
constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence. As already
noted, not all evidence of the victim's sexual past is irrelevant. But
evidence which is excludable both because it is irrelevant and be-
cause of a social policy can avoid constitutional conflict if excluded
as irrelevant. The drafters could have avoided controversy and con-
fusion by clarifying the relevance rationale of the Rule and by in-
cluding specific instances of evidence constitutionally required to be
admitted; distinct categories of evidence should have been enumer-
ated and specified under the "constitutionally required" exception.
It is clear from the Congressional commentary that the Rule's
supporters were primarily attempting to protect the victim, given
the strong language of protection and the attempt to control im-
peachment uses of the evidence. There may have been an uncon-
scious, or conscious, belief, even on the part of the Rule's
125. See supra note 12.
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supporters, that in some way this evidence was relevant to the vic-
tim's credibility or consent. It was believed to be minimally rele-
vant, perhaps, but it still carried some probative value. By refusing
to acknowledge that the evidence usually lacks relevance, the Rule's
drafters succumbed to the sexist notion that a woman's sexual past
has bearing on her propensity to consent to sexual relations or to
fabricate the charge. Therefore, lower courts will be forced to con-
tinue to determine on a case-by-case basis what evidence of the vic-
tim's sexual history is relevant for which purposes. However, once it
is accepted and codified that this evidence is not relevant to consent
or credibility, the specific constitutionally required and relevant ex-
ceptions can be enumerated.
2. The Necessary Specyic Constitutional Exceptions
The situations in which evidence of the victim's sexual history
must be admitted due to the defendant's constitutional rights can be
enumerated.'6 The catchall phrase admitting evidence if "constitu-
tionally required" is neither necessary nor appropriate. If the de-
fense to a sexual assault charge is that the victim consented to the
sexual act, the defendant has a constitutional right to present evi-
dence relevant to the victim's consent, evidence that often includes
her sexual history with the defendant This is expressly allowed by
the Rule. The defendant's constitutional rights may also require ad-
mission of evidence of an alternative source of the victim's injury,
covered by an exception to the Rule.
Furthermore, evidence relevant to a defense of misidentification
could include evidence of the lack of non-transmission of a sexually
transmitted disease from the victim to the defendant, or the birth of
a baby to the victim nine months after the alleged assault which was
not possibly the biological child of the defendant.' 7 If the defend-
ant asserts a defense of mistake, that he reasonably but incorrectly
thought the victim was consenting, then the defendant's constitu-
tional rights may require admission of parts of the victim's sexual
history.' Admission of evidence relevant to defenses of misiden-
126. The defendant in a sexual assault case has available a number of defenses,
ranging from "I wasn't there" to "there was a sexual act but she consented." Evi-
dence relevant to one defense often is irrelevant to another defense. See Haxton,
supra note 13, at 1233.
127. See UL at 1235.
128. Such a defense has "figured prominently" in the rape reform debate. 23
WRIG-T & GRAHA-I, supra note 20, § 5387, at 582. The example of an admissible
mistake defense given by Professors Wright and Graham is that "the defendant had
been told that the victim is 'turned on' by aggressive men and that her 'no' really
means 'yes.'" Id. Nevertheless, the authors admit that "[s]everal limitations on this
exception must be observed if it is not to be abused," including that the defendant
knew about the victim's prior sexual activity, that the prior activity was similar to the
activity between the victim and the defendant; and that the defendant's belief was
reasonable. Id. § 5387, at 582-83. Some would argue that the relevance of such evi-
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tification and mistake, however, is constitutionally required to be
admitted only if the defendant has not already introduced evidence
exclusively relevant to consent. 2 9
Moreover, the defendant may have a constitutional right to the
admission of evidence of the victim's sexual history to show "a pat-
tern of distinctive, consensual sexual behavior by the alleged victim
that is highly similar to the facts of the incident being charged.'
130
Evidence relevant to the defense of mistake or evidence that the
victim had a pattern of behavior is constitutionally required only if
the defendant has not already introduced evidence exclusively rele-
vant to the sexual contact.' 3 ' In addition, admission of evidence
might be constitutionally required in cases where the defendant is
utilizing the evidence to correct misrepresentations, or to impeach
witnesses with prior inconsistent statements. 32
D. Application of the Rule to Individual Cases
The Federal Rule has been applied relatively infrequently in com-
parison to state rape shield rules, because sexual crimes are usually
charged as violations of state, not federal, laws.Y The majority of
dence turns on how the defendant came to know about the information: "[t]he de-
fendant's knowledge of the complainant's prior sexual conduct can be relevant to
show consent if... the knowledge was acquired from the complainant as a disclo-
sure." Haxton, supra note 13, at 1240 (citations omitted).
129. See Haxton, supra note 13, at 1233-35.
130. 2 MUELLER & KiRKPATR cy, supra note 85, § 159, at 204. One particular
strain of such evidence would be proof that the victim was a prostitute, "but even
evidence of prostitution is irrelevant to consent if the circumstances surrounding the
alleged sexual assault are dissimilar to the prostitution." Haxton, supra note 13, at
1237.
131. See Haxton, supra note 13, at 1235.
132. See 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 85, § 159, at 202-03. Evidence
to show the victim's bias is in the same general category.
133. Nevertheless, federal courts have had occasion to employ Rule 412 in crimi-
nal cases, usually in cases of sexual crimes on Native American reservations, where
the federal courts have jurisdiction. Although several state rape shield statutes have
been challenged as facially unconstitutional, none have been found so. See Smith,
supra note 12, § 2, at 287. Some courts, however, have held particular exclusions of
evidence under state rape shield rules unconstitutional. In Latzer v. Abrams, 602 F.
Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), limitations placed on the defendant's right to cross-
examine the child victim regarding the victim's prior volitional sexual acts were a
violation of the defendant's right to confront witnesses against him. The court ap-
plied Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), and held that "rape shield rules must
yield to a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses for bias or improper
motive." Id at 1319. The court indicated that such a rule would also apply in this
case to a defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses as to possible misidentifica-
tion. See id. at 1319-20. On the other hand, some cases have held that the Rule's
exclusion did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. In Stephens v. Miller,
13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1994), the court held that the defendant had no constitutional
right to introduce evidence of statements he made to the victim regarding her prior
sexual conduct. The defendant offered the statements as proof that the victim had a
motive to fabricate the charges against him, but the court found that the evidence
[Vol. 49:443
1997] PROTECTING THE VICTIM 467
federal cases concerning the application of Federal Rule 412 have
revolved around the defendant's constitutional rights.
Although many courts have found that the specific application of
the Federal Rule led to unconstitutional results, the Rule itself has
apparently never been found unconstitutional.' The most influen-
tial case has been Doe v. United States,135 decided in 1981, in which
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that the
lower court's exclusion of the victim's sexual history violated the
defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses.1m The court
held that evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the victim's sex-
ual history was admissible as relevant to the defendant's state of
mind. 37 By framing reputation evidence as solely evidence of the
was being offered for the purpose of displaying the victim's sexual preferences to
embarrass the victim. See id. at 1001-03. In Logan v. Marshall, 540 F. Supp. 3 (NJ).
Ohio 1981), the court held that the defendant did not have a constitutional right to
cross-examine the victim as to any venereal disease she might have had at the time
of the alleged assault. The defendant had not made an adequate offer of proof re-
garding the relevance of the evidence, and the court found that such evidence was
constitutionally excluded since it would only "be used to impeach the credibility of
the victim by references to her sexual history." Id. at 6. These decisions have not
been uniform. For example, in Latzer v. Abrams, 602 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), evidence was constitutionally required to be admitted as relevant to the vic-
tim's motive, but in Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1993), similar evidence
offered for the same purpose was not constitutionally required to be admitted. In
addition, in both Stephens and Logan, the defendants were not allowed to introduce
evidence they argued was constitutionally required to be admitted; the exclusion was
not due to the court's weighing of the defendant's valid constitutional right against
the state's interests, but rather could be credited to the courts' refusal to believe that
the defendants were truly offering the evidence for the purposes stated. Stephens v.
Miller, 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1993); Logan v. Marshall, 540 F. Supp. 3 (ND. Ohio
1981).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
135. 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981). The victim appealed from a pretrial ruling by
the trial court to allow evidence and cross-examination of the victim's sexual history.
See id. at 45. Consolidated with that appeal was the victim's appeal from the judg-
ment against her in a civil case she had initiated to permanently seal the record of
the criminal case. See id.
136. The defense was not explicitly one of mistake of fact that the victim had
consented; the defendant merely argued that telephone conversations in which the
victim discussed her sexual past were relevant to his state of mind. See Id. at 48.
137. See id. The Fourth Circuit also found that some of the evidence admitted at
trial should have been excluded, specifying the following:
(1) evidence of the victim's "general reputation in and around the Army
post.. . where [the defendant] resided";
(2) evidence of the victim's "habit of calling out to the barracks to speak
to various and sundry soldiers";
(3) evidence of the victim's "habit of coming to the post to meet people
and of her habit of being at the barracks at the snack bar";
(4) evidence from the victim's former landlord regarding "his experience
with her" alleged promiscuous behavior,
(5) evidence of what a social worker learned of the victim.
Id. at 47.
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defendant's state of mind, the court avoided the Rule 412 bar on
reputation evidence as well as the Rule's substantive limitations on
the introduction of the victim's sexual past.138
In admitting phone conversations between the defendant and the
victim regarding the victim's sexual history, the court found them to
be relevant and "not the type of evidence that the rule excludes. 139
Significantly, the court reasoned that the rationale of the Rule was
to exclude evidence not relevant to the consent or credibility of the
victim.1 40 The court further stated that "[tihere is no indication,
however, that this evidence was intended to be excluded when of-
fered solely to show the accused's state of mind."1 4 ' This approach
left the door open for the admission of all evidence of the victim's
sexual history within the knowledge of the defendant and claimed
by the defendant to be relevant to his mistake that the victim had
consented.
In United States v. Begay, 42 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the trial court had erred by not allowing the defendant,
accused of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, to cross-examine a
medical witness on other possible causes of the victim's injury.143
Furthermore, the court held that the defendant had a right to cross-
examine the victim on her sexual history for the purpose of im-
peaching her memory of the abuse."' The defendant was allowed
to impeach the witness on the basis that her memory of abuses by
another person was stronger than her memory of abuses by the de-
fendant, thereby discrediting her testimony regarding her memory
of her abuse by the defendant.1 45
138. The Fourth Circuit recognized that the evidence of the victim's sexual habits
was being offered mainly in the form of opinion and reputation evidence, and was
therefore barred by Rule 412. The court explained the "constitutional justification
for excluding reputation and opinion evidence" of the victim's sexual history as fol-
lows: "First, an accused is not constitutionally entitled to present irrelevant evi-
dence. Second, reputation and opinion concerning a victim's past sexual behavior
are not relevant indicators of the likelihood of her consent to a specific sexual act or
of her veracity." Id.
139. Id. at 48. The evidence of the defendant's state of mind included the opin-
ions of others that the victim was promiscuous. See id. at 47.
140. See id. at 48.
141. Id.
142. 937 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1991).
143. See id. at 525-26.
144. See id. at 521.
145. See id. Apparently the victim's testimony regarding the circumstances of the
attack was not strong, and she at times indicated she could not clearly remember
what happened. Therefore the court found that "cross-examination about the [third
person] incidents was relevant and probative on the central issue whether [the vic-
tim's] memory was clear and accurate on critical details about the Begay incident as
contrasted with the [third person] incidents." Id.
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Other cases have found the Rule to be constitutional in its partic-
ular application. In United States v. Payne,146 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the defendant's right to confront a child
sexual assault victim was not violated by the exclusion of evidence
that the child had engaged in consensual sexual activity with an-
other. The court reasoned that "the probative value of minor incon-
sistencies regarding an obviously embarrassing situation is virtually
nil and does not outweigh theprejudicial effect" of the evidence.147
In United States v. Cardinal,' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the trial court's exclusion of prior claims of sexual abuse
made by a child victim did not compromise the defendant's right to
confront witnesses. The defendant offered the evidence as relevant
to the victim's credibility, arguing that consequently Rule 412 did
not apply.14 9 The Court of Appeals held that the trial court, in ex-
cluding the evidence, had properly demonstrated a "sensitivity to
the policy supporting the rape-shield rule."' 50 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in United States v. Azure,"5' held that the trial
court properly excluded evidence of the child victim's prior history
offered by the defendant to impeach her.' The court stated that
evidence offered for impeachment purposes did not satisfy the spe-
cific exception of Rule 412, and therefore was not admissible."'
There has not been a uniform analysis of the constitutional issues
raised by sexual crime defendants. In Payne, evidence was excluded
because it had de minimus probative value;154 yet in Azure, no rele-
vance discussion was even entertained."5 Moreover, in Doe, the
court treated the evidence as if it were solely evidence of the de-
fendant's state of mind and ignored the implications that the evi-
dence also should have been classified as evidence of the victim's
sexual history." 6 In so doing, the court ignored the language and
objectives of Rule 412 and created a new exception.5 7
146. 944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1991).
147. Id. at 1469.
148. 782 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1986).
149. See id. at 36.
150. Id.
151. 845 F.2d 1503 (8th Cir. 1988).
152. Id. at 1506. The defendant first tried to introduce the evidence under one of
the specific exceptions to Rule 412, but failed. See id. at 1505.
153. See id. at 1506. The court did not fully explore the constitutional issues, but
merely stated that when offered for impeachment purposes, the evidence was not
admissible under Rule 412. See iU
154. See United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1470 (9th Cir. 1991).
155. See United States v. Azure, 845 F.2d 1503 (8th Cir. 1938).
156. See Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1981).
157. See DiBattiste, supra note 6, at 145.
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E. Criticisms of and Commentary on the Rule
A major flaw in Rule 412 is its "failure to distinguish between
benign and invidious uses of sexual conduct evidence." 158 This inad-
equacy "stems from a misperception by the drafters of the precise
wrong to be redressed" by the Rule.159 The Advisory Committee's
Note's failure to explore possible justifications for the Rule other
than "strong social policy" has led to a wide variety of interpreta-
tions by courts and commentators as to the purpose of Rule 412.160
Interpretations include ending the misuse of evidence of the victim's
sexual history, protecting privacy interests of victims, and excluding
wholly irrelevant evidence. 161
Courts and commentators alike have criticized the Rule's drafters
for not explaining the breadth of the "as constitutionally required"
provision. In Begay, the court noted that "'the Rule provides no
guidance as to the meaning of the phrase "constitutionally re-
quired."',,162 Without a clear explanation "from the Supreme Court
stating when a rule of evidence must yield to the accused's sixth
amendment right to offer proof in support of a defense, the catch-
basin provision offers no guidance to trial courts regarding what evi-
dence meets the statutory standard."'16 Although there are several
specific situations in which admission of evidence may be constitu-
tionally required to be admitted, the drafters made no attempt to
158. Galvin, supra note 2, at 812.
159. Id.
160. FED. R. Evi. 412 advisory committee's note.
161. Rape shield rules have been interpreted by commentators as serving widely
varied purposes. One commentator noted that it was "apparent that the only evi-
dence excluded exclusively by rape shield statutes is sexual conduct evidence that is
highly probative." Haxton, supra note 13, at 1254. Rape shield rules, another con-
cluded, "were meant to exclude irrelevant and prejudicial evidence that does noth-
ing but taint the fact-finding process." Galvin, supra note 2, at 887. Yet another
commentator recognized only the privacy interest of the victim as a motivation for
rape shield rules. See Jason M. Price, Note, Constitutional Law-Sex, Lies and Rape
Shield Statutes: The Constitutionality of Interpreting Rape Shield Statutes to Exclude
Evidence Relating to the Victim's Motive to Fabricate, 18 W. NEw ENO. L. Rlv. 541,
541 (1996).
162. United States v. Begay, 937 F.2d 515, 523 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United
States v. Saunders, 736 F. Supp. 698, 703 (E.D.Va. 1990)).
163. Galvin, supra note 2, at 886-87. Evidence was also "getting in under the
catch-all exception when the judge [was] sympathetic to the argument that the vic-
tim was an undeserving one." Transcript of Proceedings, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules 56 (May 6, 1993) (statement of Danielle Ben-Jehuda, staff attorney with the
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund). Other critics of the provision noted that
all evidence that is constitutionally required to be admitted will be admitted, regard-
less of a specific rule that would exclude the evidence. See Galvin, supra note 2, at
886. One member of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence admitted
that "[iut is an odd clause, because it suggests that there is something unconstitu-
tional about the rule." Transcript of Proceedings, supra, at 57 (statement of Chair-
man Ralph K. Winter).
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categorize the exceptions and enumerate them.1' It is poor policy
to leave the construction of constitutional rights in the hands of
lower courts because they may come to disparate conclusions."e
A woman's sexual choices in the past have little bearing on
whether she consented to the sexual act from which a charge of rape
or sexual assault has arisen. Although protecting victims of crime
from unnecessary humiliation and harassment is a worthy goal, it is
harmful to avoid the foundational analysis of whether evidence of
the victim's sexual history is relevant. The policies supporting the
Rule are paternalistic, chauvinistic, and outdated; by avoiding the
most obvious and justifiable rationale for the Rule-that inquiry
into the victim's sexual history is not relevant to whether she was
raped-the drafters implicitly accepted the common law ideas that a
sexually active woman is more likely to be raped or she is more
likely to lie about being raped. Furthermore, these policies run the
risk of supporting the prejudices that a sexually active woman is
worthy neither of the jury's belief nor the law's protection.
Even when the defendant's rights to compulsory process and to
confront witnesses are implicated, a balancing test of the defend-
ant's rights and the victim's or state's interests should be required,
because the defendant's rights "may be abridged by other legitimate
interests in the criminal process. Courts may restrict the defendant's
right if favoring other legitimate interests is neither arbitrary nor
disproportionate to the detrimental effect on the defendant."" As
it is stated, the Rule leaves the impression that if the defendant's
constitutional rights are implicated, no other competing interests
can supplant those rights.
Despite these criticisms, 67 the Rule has been fairly successful in
implementing its policy. Nevertheless, though rarely discussed, the
relevance value of evidence excluded by Rule 412 is often assumed
to be high. The drafters failed to advocate the Rule as one that
excludes irrelevant evidence, and thus the Rule has faced unneces-
sary constitutional confrontations and continues to engender confu-
sion in its application.
164. See I GRAiHAm, supra note 119, § 412.1, at 485.
165. See DiBattiste, supra note 6, at 155-56.
166. Price, supra note 161, at 546.
167. Critics have concluded that Rule 412 is a "sloppily drafted effort to foist off
on the courts another politically-charged evidentiary issue that the legislators lacked
the wit or courage to resolve." 23 Wrarro & GRAHA, supra note 20, § 5382, at
530.
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IV. THE MAINE RAPE SHIELD RULE
A. Maine Common Law Rules Regarding the Victim's Sexual
History
Under the common law of Maine, evidence of the victim's sexual
history was admitted as relevant to a supposed character trait of un-
chastity. 1' 8 However, the common law rule in Maine espoused a
somewhat unique use of the evidence. In the seminal case of State v.
Flaherty,169 decided in 1929, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sit-
ting as the Law Court, stated that the victim's character trait of un-
chastity was admissible to "impeach the testimony of the
prosecuting witness as to the want of consent. ' 170 This was a hybrid
use of the evidence-it went to the victim's credibility but only on
her testimony regarding a particular element of the crime of rape:
lack of consent.
In State v. Nelson,171 the Law Court reversed the trial court's ex-
clusion of evidence of the victim's past sexual relationship with the
defendant. 72 The court relied on an 1888 Indiana case to support
its rationale that "[e]vidence of a prosecutrix's prior sexual relations
with a defendant bears both on the prosecutrix's credibility and the
issue of whether she acquiesced."173
In Maine, proof of the victim's sexual character could be shown
only by evidence of general reputation, not by specific acts. This
rule was established in 1889 in Gore v. Curtis.74 In Gore, the court
did not allow the defendant in a civil case for trespass for assault
upon and solicitation of the victim, a married woman, to question
the victim about her specific acts of unchastity, but offered to allow
him to bring in her general reputation for unchastity.175 The court's
rationale was that "[p]ersons seeking damages in actions of this sort
must be prepared to defend their general character; but are not re-
quired to come ready to explain the various specific questionable
acts of their lives."' 76 In State v. Henderson,77 the Law Court noted
168. See State v. Flaherty, 128 Me. 141, 146 A. 7 (1929).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 146, 146 A. at 9.
171. 399 A.2d 1327 (Me. 1979). In Nelson, the defendant was charged with un-
lawful sexual contact, a crime not directly covered by the Rule when it was originally
enacted.
172. See id, at 1329.
173. Id. at 1329 n.3 (emphasis added) (referring to Bedgood v. State, 17 N.E. 621,
623 (Ind. 1888)). It is unclear why the court chose not to rely on Flaherty; perhaps it
was distinguishing F/aherty by stating that the evidence was relevant to both the
victim's credibility and the issue of consent. See State v. Flaherty, 128 Me. 141, 146
A. 7 (1929).
174. 81 Me. 403, 17 A. 314 (1889).
175. See id. at 404, 17 A. at 314.
176. Id. at 405, 17 A. at 315.
177. 153 Me. 364, 139 A.2d 515 (1958).
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that evidence of the victim's reputation for unchastity was admissi-
ble to impeach the victim-on the issue of lack of consent.' In
State v. McFarland,'79 the Law Court held that "[specific acts of
prior unchastity are not admissible in a prosecution for rape.' 1 °
B. Enactment of Maine Rule of Evidence 412
1. Discussion of Text of Rule and Advisory Committee's Note
Maine Rule of Evidence 412 was enacted in 1983, five years after
Federal Rule of Evidence 412. It is a rule of general inadmissibility
of evidence of a sexual crime victim's past sexual behavior, with spe-
cific narrow exceptions.' The Rule as originally enacted applied
when the crimes of rape, gross sexual misconduct, or sexual assault
of a minor were charged.' It has been amended slightly, and now
is triggered when the charge is rape, gross sexual assault, gross sex-
ual misconduct, unlawful sexual contact, or sexual abuse of a mi-
178. See id. at 369, 139 A.2d at 518. The defendant was charged with statutory
rape, for which consent was not a defense in Maine.
179. 369 A.2d 227 (Me. 1977).
180. Id. at 228 (emphasis added). The court utilized Maine Rule of Evidence
608(b), disallowing evidence of specific instances of conduct of a witness, when of-
fered for the purpose of attacking his credibility by proof of extrinsic evidence. Id.
181. The Maine Rule as originally enacted stated:
RULE 412-PAST SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF VICIIM
a. In a criminal case in which a person is accused of rape, gross sexual
misconduct, or sexual abuse of a minor, reputation or opinion evidence of
past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such crime is not admissible.
b. In a criminal case in which a person is accused of rape, gross sexual
misconduct, or sexual abuse of a minor, the only evidence of a victim's past
sexual behavior that may be admitted is the following.
(1) Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior with persons
other than the accused, offered by the accused upon the issue of
whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged
victim, the source of semen or injury, or
(2) Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior with the ac-
cused offered by the accused on the issue of whether the alleged
victim consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which the
accused is charged.
Me. Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LXVIHL In 1995, Maine Rule 412 was amended slightly, to
reflect changes in the Maine Criminal Code and to extend the application of the
Rule to the crime of unlawful sexual contact. ME. R. Evm. 412- The Committee
noted that the crimes of "rape" and "gross sexual misconduct" had been combined
into "gross sexual assault." See Mn. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note to 1995
amend., reprinted in RicHARD L FmLD & PErER L MuRRAY, MAIm EvIDNca
176-77 (4th ed. 1997). The Committee gave no explicit reason for the extension of
the Rule to cover unlawful sexual contact. See id. The Advisory Committee noted
that "[t]he policies which made Rule 412 applicable to the crimes as earlier defined
remain valid with respect to the redefined and renamed offense." Id. The Amend-
ments to the Rule are mainly technical, to maintain consistency with the criminal
code.
182. See Me. Rptr., 449-458 A2d LXVIIL
1997]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
nor."8 It explicitly excludes all reputation and opinion evidence, no
matter what the purpose of the offer, and limits admission of specific
instances of the victim's sexual history to two narrow exceptions,
both directed at evidence offered by the accused. 1"
The first exception admits evidence of the victim's past sexual be-
havior with someone other than the defendant, if offered by the de-
fendant to prove that someone other than the defendant was the
source of the victim's injury or the source of semen.1a5 The second
exception allows the defense to offer evidence of the victim's sexual
history with the defendant, if offered to prove that the victim did in
fact consent.186 This exception is available only in "criminal prose-
cutions where consent of the victim is an issue."187
In addition to the exceptions explicit in the Rule, there are also
unwritten exceptions, constituting the "residuum of circumstances
where past sexual behavior of victims may become the subject of
testimony at a trial. ' '18 The Advisory Committee's Note explains
that although the Rule's specific exceptions are limited to evidence
offered by the defendant, the prosecution may still introduce the
subject by offering evidence of the victim's chastity.189 By so doing,
the prosecution creates a right for the defendant to rebut the prose-
183. See ME. R. Evm. 412.
184. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 412 does not elaborate on the defi-
nitions of "victim" and "accused." ME. R. Evo. 412 advisory committee's note,
reprinted in RICHARD H. FiELD & PETER L. MURRAY, MAINE EVIDENCE 176-77
(4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter ME. R. Evil. 412 advisory committee's note]. Thus far,
Maine courts have employed "victim" to mean the complaining victim in a prosecu-
tion, and have construed "accused" to mean the criminal defendant. The Note re-
frains from defining "sexual behavior," but the Law Court has ruled that "sexual
behavior" does not include only volitional acts; it can also mean prior abuses. See
State v. Jacques, 558 A.2d 706, 707 n.2 (Me. 1989).
185. See ME. R. Evni. 412(b)(1).
186. See ME. R. EvmD. 412(b)(2).
187. ME. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184. One treatise
suggested that in applying this narrow exception the court should "require that the
circumstances of the prior instances be such as to raise a reasonable inference of
consent at the time and place in question." RICHARD H. FmLD & PETER L. MUR-
RAY, MAINE EVIDENCE § 412.2, at 180 (4th ed. 1997).
188. I&
189. See ME. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184. The Note
refers to State v. Gagne, 343 A.2d 186 (Me. 1975), although that case did not present
exactly the same situation. In Gagne, the defendant, in impeaching a witness on her
cross-examination, introduced an area of evidence that the court had previously for-
bidden the prosecution to enter. See id. at 194. Thus, the prosecution was allowed to
explore the subject, after the defendant had opened the door. See id. Gagne does
not hold that the prosecution can avoid a Rule of Evidence which excludes certain
evidence. The specific exceptions in Rule 412 do not allow for any instance in which
the prosecution may offer evidence of the victim's sexual history. If the prosecution
introduces evidence of the victim's sexual past, the Rule has been violated. The
Advisory Committee's Note states that "[o]bviously Rule 412 applies to the prosecu-
tion as well as to the defense," indicating that the drafters intended the Rule to
apply with full force to the prosecution; therefore there should not be an instance in
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cution's evidence. The other unwritten exception occurs when the
victim is a minor and the presumption of naivet6 is implicated."' 0
2. Comparison to Federal Rule of Evidence 412
Maine Rule of Evidence 412 is modeled on the original Federal
Rule of Evidence 412.191 The same bar to all reputation and opin-
ion evidence applies.192 The two exceptions to inadmissibility for
specific acts of the victim's sexual history are also the same.193
Nevertheless, the Maine Rule differs from the original Federal
Rule in many respects. The Maine Rule does not include the con-
troversial "as constitutionally required" exception. The Committee
apparently recognized that evidence constitutionally required to be
admitted despite its potential exclusion by a rule of evidence would
always be admitted, and stated in the first paragraph of the Advi-
sory Committee's Note: "The rule is subject to the policy of Rule
402 on evidence constitutionally required to be admitted."194 How-
ever, the reference to this obvious fact in the Advisory Committee's
Note reveals a concern that Rule 412 would be unconstitutional.
Moreover, the Maine Rule does not require written notice, an in
camera hearing, or other procedural mechanisms. Procedural safe-
guards were deemed unnecessary, "in light of the trial judge's power
to control the presentation of the proof so as to minimize prejudice
and the overall requirements of Rule 403."195
The Maine Rule excluded the introductory phrases included in
original Federal Rule 412 that the Rule was to be applied "notwith-
standing any other provision of law."196 The Advisory Committee
intentionally omitted this language that would make the Rule
supreme over all others, specifically noting that Rule 403 considera-
tions could exclude evidence even if it were admissible under Rule
412.197 Furthermore, the Note states that the victim's statements
about her sexual history might be admissible for impeachment pur-
poses, in contrast to the current Federal Rule's Advisory Commit-
which the prosecution is allowed to "open the door." See ME. L Evm. 412 advi-
sory committee's note, supra note 184.
190. Although the interaction between the childhood naivet6 presumption and
Rule 412 is very interesting, it is beyond the scope of this Comment. See infra note
235, for a limited discussion of the application of Rule 412 in cases where the child-
hood naivet6 presumption was implicated.
191. Mn. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184.
192. See Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, supra note 9; Mn. L Evw.
412.
193. See Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, supra note 9; Mr. RL EVnD.
412.
194. Mn. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184.
195. See id.
196. See Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act, supra note 9.
197. See Mn. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184.
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tee's Note, which asserts that the Rule is applicable even if the
evidence is offered to impeach.19
3. Advisory Committee's Justification for the Rule
Maine Rule 412 was enacted "to curb perceived abuses in the use
of evidence concerning the past sexual behavior of a victim of rape
or sexual abuse."'19 9 The Advisory Committee's Note to Maine
Rule 412 recognized that past abuses occurred when "some courts"
allowed defense counsel to introduce the victim's sexual history on
the issues of the victim's consent and the victim's overall credibil-
ity.200 The Committee did not consider such abuses to be "a serious
problem in Maine, where such testimony has been generally ex-
cluded."' Nonetheless, the Committee felt that some "dicta" in
Maine cases might be misread to allow the introduction of the vic-
tim's sexual history.2"
198. See ME. R EvrD. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184; FED. R.
EvID. 412 advisory committee's note.
199. ME. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184.
200. See id. One treatise noted that "[t]o the extent that prior Maine cases may
have permitted reputation or opinion evidence concerning a victim's lack of chastity,
those cases are no longer good law." FmLD & MURRAY, supra note 187, § 412.1, at
179.
201. ME. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184. The Commit-
tee advanced this rationale despite many Maine cases that explicitly condoned the
introduction of the victim's sexual history, embracing the common law rules of the
time. Perhaps the Committee was relying on the most recent cases, such as State v.
White, 456 A.2d 13 (Me. 1983), which did not allow specific instances of the victim's
sexual history to be introduced in a child sexual abuse case, or State v. McFarland,
369 A.2d 227, 228 (Me. 1977), which held that specific instances of the victim's sex-
ual history were not admissible in a rape prosecution. The Committee may have felt
that these cases represented a trend toward exclusion of the victim's sexual history.
Nevertheless, these cases can be read as merely excluding specific acts as a form of
proof of the victim's sexual history, consistent with the common law rules allowing
only reputation and opinion evidence to prove a victim's sexual history.
202. ME. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184 (citing State v.
McFarland, 369 A.2d 227 (Me. 1977); State v. Dipietrantonio, 152 Me. 41, 122 A.2d
414 (Me. 1956); State v. Flaherty, 128 Me. 141, 146 A. 7 (1929)). In fact, Flaherty
held that although proof of the victim's sexual history by specific acts was not al-
lowed, evidence of the victim's reputation for unchastity was admissible. State v.
Flaherty, 128 Me. at 146, 146 A. at 9. In both Dipietrantonlo and McFarland, the
only evidence offered, and thus the only evidence excluded, was specific Instances of
the victim's sexual history. State v. McFarland, 369 A.2d at 228; State v. Dipie-
trantonio, 152 Me. at 46, 122 A.2d at 418. Both Flaherty and Dipietrantonlo, in ex-
cluding specific acts, specifically stated that evidence of reputation might be
admissible. One should note that McFarland refers to Flaherty and Dipietrantonlo
to exclude specific acts. State v. McFarland, 369 A.2d at 228; State v. Flaherty, 128
Me. at 146, 146 A. at 7; State v. Dipietrantonio, 152 Me. at 46, 122 A.2d at 418. Thus,
although none of these cases admitted specific acts to prove the victim's sexual his-
tory, all three indicated that the reason for the exclusion was not that the victim's
sexual history was per se inadmissible, but rather that the form of evidence
presented was inadmissible.
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The Advisory Committee focused on the abuses suffered by a vic-
tim of sexual crimes and the misuse of evidence regarding her sexual
history, stating: "The danger in the admission of such evidence is
the likelihood that it will provoke moral and emotional reactions in
the trier of fact increasing the risk of unfair prejudice."' -  The Rule
overturned Maine's common law theory that the victim's sexual his-
tory, as an indication of her character trait of chastity, was relevant
to her credibility especially on the issue of consent.3° In addition,
the Rule forbids the use of reputation or opinion evidence to prove
the victim's sexual history; nevertheless, evidence of specific acts
was the only form allowed under the common law. Nevertheless,
the Advisory Committee did not refer to the fact that the Rule was
overturning the common law theories of relevance of this evidence,
nor did it comment on any theory of relevance regarding evidence
of the victim's sexual history. Instead, the Rule is safely couched in
a broad policy-to protect victims of sexual crimes.
Significantly, Rule 412 is within Article IV of the Maine Rules of
Evidence, which is entitled "Relevance and its Limits." 10s The Ad-
visory Committee's Note does not refer to the relevance of the vic-
tim's sexual history to either her credibility or her consent. In fact,
the Advisory Committee's Note only mentions the words "relevant"
or "relevancy" twice. -° One of the two references occurs when the
Advisory Committee explains that a victim's statements about her
sexual history might be admissible if "relevant" to impeachment, or
offered for "some other proper purpose."' ' 7 The Committee did
not indicate what another "proper purpose" might be, since the
Rule purports to name the only two specific purposes for which the
victim's sexual history may be offered. "° In addition to clouding
203. Mn. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
205. Mn. R. EVD. art. IV.
206. See Mn. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184. One refer-
ence occurs when the Advisory Committee's Note points out that the Rule applied
only in criminal cases of rape, gross sexual misconduct, or the sexual abuse of a
minor, in all other cases, the rules of "relevancy and impeachment" were to apply.
See id.
207. See id.
208. Some Maine Rules of Evidence exclude evidence for all purposes including
impeachment. Maine Rule of Evidence 408(b) excludes evidence of statements
made at court-sponsored domestic relations mediation sessions, no matter what the
purpose offered. Mn. R. EvD. 408(b). Maine Rule of Evidence 410 excludes evi-
dence of a withdrawn guilty or nolo contendere plea regardless of the purpose for
which it is offered. M. R. EvW. 410. Other Maine Rules, however, exclude evi-
dence only when offered for specified purposes, but do not exclude the evidence
when offered to impeach. For example, Maine Rule of Evidence 409 excludes evi-
dence of any offer to pay medical costs if offered to "prove liability for the injury."
Mn. R. EviD. 409. Maine Rule of Evidence 411 excludes evidence of liability insur-
ance if offered to prove negligence. Mn. R. Evm. 411. Both Rules 409 and 411
allow the evidence to be admitted for purposes of impeachment.
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the relationship between constitutional rights and the Rule, the ab-
sence of the Rule's relevance analysis allows the stereotypes and
prejudices associated with information about the victim's sexual his-
tory to exist underneath the Rule of policy. The outdated and sexist
ideas that a sexually active woman is more likely to be raped or to
lie about being raped, or is less worthy of the protection of the law,
are safely cloaked beneath the policy of protection of the victim and
prevention of unfair use of her sexual past.
C. Application of the Rule to Individual Cases
1. General Application of the Rule
The Law Court has had several occasions to evaluate lower court
interpretations of Rule 412 in sexual crime cases. Exclusions based
on Rule 412 have been held constitutional in most cases although
exclusions have been deemed unconstitutional in a few instances.
The court has recognized that the defendant's right to confront wit-
nesses does not automatically require admission of evidence of the
victim's sexual history; the balancing test must be employed. Addi-
tionally, the Law Court and lower courts appear reluctant to apply
Rule 412 when other rules can be applied to achieve the same
result.
2 °9
Just a few months after the Rule was enacted, State v. Siegfried21 °
was decided by the Law Court.211 The Law Court upheld the trial
court's exclusion of evidence of the victim's sexual past because its
relevance "approached zero" and was therefore properly excluded
under Rule 403 because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
209. Sometimes the court has been able to exclude information based solely on
mistakes made by the parties offering the evidence. For example, in State v. Phil-
brick, 551 A.2d 847 (Me. 1988), the Law Court upheld the trial court's decision to
exclude the defendant's evidence that the victim was a prostitute. The defendant
had asserted an alibi defense to the charge of gross sexual misconduct, rather than a
consent defense which would have conflicted with his alibi defense; on appeal he
argued that the trial court's exclusion had prevented him from asserting a consent
defense. See id at 850-51. The Law Court stated that if the evidence had been
offered as relevant to a consent defense, it "would have been admissible," under the
second exception of Rule 412. See id. at 851. Nevertheless, based on the inadequate
offer made by the defendant, the evidence of the victim's prostitution was properly
excluded. The Law Court also seemed to doubt the purpose the defendant stated
for offering the evidence, noting that the defendant would not be allowed "to dis-
credit the victim's character by attempting to show that she was a prostitute." Id. It
is interesting to note that if the defendant had properly asserted a consent defense,
as well as offered his evidence in the form of specific instances of sexual relations
between himself and the victim, the evidence would have been admissible, according
to the Law Court, even though it acknowledged that the defendant's aim was to
attack the victim's character. See id.
210. 460 A.2d 1382 (Me. 1983).
211. Note that the Rule was not in effect when the trial court heard the case.
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outweighed the probative value of the evidence." The Law Court
could have mentioned that Rule 412 would have reached the same
conclusion if it had been in effect at the time of trial.
In State v. Rossignol,2 13 the Law Court followed the Advisory
Committee's Note's guidance that "admissibility of... evidence [of
the victim's sexual past] is determined by considerations of rele-
vancy and impeachment" when the charge is unlawful sexual con-
tact, which is not explicitly within the scope of the Rule.214 The
defendant's offer of evidence regarding the victim's state of mind,
which included evidence of her sexual experiences, was rejected by
the trial court.215 At trial, the defendant wanted the evidence ad-
mitted "to challenge the prosecutrix's credibility." '216 The Law
Court upheld the trial court's exclusion of the evidence, because
"[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretionary power in the areas
of relevancy and impeachment."217
In State v. Huntley, 218 the defendant argued on appeal that the
trial court had violated his constitutional rights by limiting his cross-
examination of the victim regarding her abuse by another person.21
The trial court allowed cross-examination on the issue of whether
coercion of the victim by the other abuser had occurred, but not on
the nature of the actual abuse. 22- The Law Court found that the
limitation was not a violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights.'- 1 The court reiterated that "the limitation of Rule 412 must
be weighed against a defendant's constitutional right to present a
proper defense by effective cross-examination," and found that the
defendant's right did not automatically require unlimited cross-
examination.'
In State v. Adams,' 3 the defendant argued that evidence of the
victim's sexual history was relevant to the victim's bias, which he
had a constitutional right to expose. 2 4 The Law Court upheld the
212. See State v. Siegfried, 460 A.2d at 1383.
213. 490 A.2d 673 (Me. 1985).
214. Id. at 675.
215. See 1d. at 674.
216. Id. On appeal, the defendant slightly changed the characterization of his
offer, stating it was for the purpose of showing "that the prosecutrix was biased
against defendant." Id.
217. Id. at 675.
218. 681 A.2d 10 (Me. 1996).
219. See id. at 12-13.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 13.
222. Id. The defendant also argued that the evidence was admissible to rebut the
childhood naivetd presumption on appeal, even though he had not preserved the
issue at trial; the Law Court found no obvious error (the standard applied when the
issue was not preserved at trial). See id
223. 544 A.2d 299 (Me. 1988).
224. See id at 301.
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trial court's ruling to admit some evidence of the victim's sexual his-
tory with a limiting instruction. 25 Instead of utilizing Rule 412,
however, the court relied on Rule 403 to uphold the exclusion, and
noted that it "need not therefore decide whether the testimony was
also precluded under Rule 412."' 26
In State v. Steen,' 7 the Law Court upheld the trial court's ruling
preventing the defendant's cross-examination of the victim about a
prior rape allegation she had made.' The defendant offered this
evidence on the issue of the victim's credibility.229 The trial court
excluded the evidence, primarily because the testimony regarding
the victim's prior rape allegation was controverted; the trial court
felt testimony on the issue would create a mini-trial. 30 The trial
court weighed the competing considerations recognized in Rule 403,
finding that the evidence had very little probative value as to the
victim's credibility, and any such value was substantially outweighed
by the danger of confusion of the issues. 31 Rule 412 could not be
applied directly because the defendant was not offering evidence of
voluntary sexual acts by the victim, but rather her statements about
involuntary sexual assaults upon her. 3 2
The Law Court upheld the lower court's "determination that the
probative value of [the defendant's] evidence was outweighed by the
possibility of jury confusion and delay," and found there had been
no violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.' 3 Although
neither the trial court nor the Law Court directly attributed its rul-
ing to Rule 412, the rationale of Rule 412 was implicated in the ex-
clusion of the evidence due to Rule 403 considerations, which in
some ways overlap Rule 412 considerations.
One of the "unwritten exceptions" to Rule 412 arose in State v.
Leonard,' when the prosecution introduced evidence at trial of the
victim's sexual history. The Law Court subsequently overturned the
trial court's exclusion of this evidence. The Law Court found that
the defendant should have been allowed to rebut the prosecution's
evidence of the victim's lack of sexual experience prior to the as-
sault.235 Furthermore, the evidence should have been admitted for
225. See id
226. Id.
227. 623 A.2d 146 (Me. 1993).
228. See id. at 150. The conviction, however, was later reversed on separate
grounds.
229. See id. at 149.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. This would be the obvious reason Rule 412 did not apply directly. Neither
the trial court nor the Law Court stated the reason for not applying Rule 412.
233. State v. Steen, 623 A.2d at 150.
234. 513 A.2d 1352 (Me. 1986).
235. See id. at 1354-55.
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the purpose of impeaching the victim's testimony concerning the
background and circumstances of the charge.3
2. Case Discussions of the Rationale of the Rule
The Law Court expressly stated its view of the purpose of Rule
412 only once, in State v. Jacques,-37 a case regarding the childhood
naivet6 presumption. There, the court declared that "[t]he purpose
of the Rule is to prevent a trial from becoming a trial of the victim,
rather than the accused."'' 38 In Adams, the court upheld the exclu-
sion of the victim's sexual history because it "carried the substantial
risk of confusing the issues."'"2 9 The Law Court seems to have
viewed Rule 412 as encompassing the traditional Rule 403 consider-
ations, given the court's reference to both Rule 412 and Rule 403,
without distinguishing between the two Rules' purposes or results.
236. See id. at 1355. The State elicited from the victim details of a prior sexual
assault by the defendant "to establish the alleged scheme or plan to use the Com-
plainant as a surrogate mother." Id. at 1354. Nevertheless, the Law Court felt that
"[p]atently, there was no need to go into the details of the intercourse for purposes
of showing the scheme or plan.... In so doing, the State 'opened the door' to
evidence contradicting the Complainant's statements as to her chastity to attack her
credibility." Id. The second "unwritten exception," the childhood naivet6 presump-
tion, has been prevalent in Maine case law. It was employed in State v. Jacques, 558
A.2d 706 (Me. 1989), where the Law Court upheld the pre-Rule 412 case law that
evidence of a child victim's sexual history should be admitted. In State v. Davis, 406
A.2d 900 (Me. 1979), the Law Court adopted the defense's argument that such evi-
dence should be admitted "to prevent the jury from assigning to the complainant's
testimony the kind of credibility they might otherwise give it because of the ten-
dency to attribute an innocence in sexual matters to a child." Id. at 901. In State v.
Jacques, the Law Court held that although "[t]he past sexual behavior of a victim is
generally not admissible" under Rule 412, "the State's legitimate interest in protect-
ing victims of sexual abuse is neither absolute nor paramount." State v. Jacques, 558
A.2d at 707. In fact, "[t]he State's interest must be weighed against the defendant's
constitutional right of effective cross-examination and to present a proper defense."
Id. at 708. The Law Court later created limitations on the broad rule of Jacques, as
exemplified in State v. Knox, 634 A.2d 952 (Me. 1993). The defendant in Knox,
relying on Jacques, offered testimony from a ten-year-old witness who claimed to
have had sexual relations with the fourteen-year-old victim four or five years prior
to the alleged assault by the defendant, for the purpose of rebutting the childhood
naivet6 presumption. See id. at 953. The Law Court established that "[blefore testi-
mony to rebut the tender years assumption becomes admissible, the assumption it-
self must arise. For the inference to arise, the child witness must display extraordinary
sexual knowledge for his or her age" Id. (emphasis added). This modified approach
to the childhood naivetd presumption, that the presumption is invoked only if the
child portrays extraordinary sexual knowledge for her age, reflected federal law. In
United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1991), the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated that the presumption of childhood naivet6 was not triggered
unless the child displayed extraordinary sexual knowledge for his or her age. See Id.
at 1474.
237. 558 A.2d 706 (Me. 1989).
238. Id. at 707.
239. State v. Adams, 544 A2d 299, 301 (Me. 1988).
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D. Summary and Criticisms of the Rule and Its Application
1. Summary and Analysis of Application of the Rule
Maine Rule of Evidence 412 has protected victims of sexual
crimes from the exploitation of their sexual history in court. The
general inadmissibility of evidence of the victim's sexual history and
the complete bar to reputation and opinion evidence have severely
limited the introduction of this evidence. Rule 412 forced courts to
cease viewing the victim's sexual history as relevant to her credibil-
ity, and drastically reduced instances in which the victim's sexual
history would be held relevant to the issue of consent. In several
cases, including Steen, the court ruled that such evidence offered on
the issue of the victim's credibility would not be admissible n0
Although the Law Court has not had occasion to rule directly that
such evidence is not admissible as relevant to the victim's consent,
that may be because the Rule is working so well that evidence of-
fered for this purpose is not admitted at the trial court level. 41
Prior to the 1995 amendments to the Rule, courts trying unlawful
sexual contact cases rarely employed Rule 412 by analogy, but
rather used the principles of "relevancy and impeachment" for gui-
dance, as instructed by the Advisory Committee's Note.242 Thus,
Rules 403 and 611 were more often employed. Although the poli-
cies of Rule 412 can be realized by applying Rule 403, the applica-
tion of Rule 403 does not always produce the same outcome that
Rule 412's use would have. In Leonard, the Law Court overturned
the trial court's exclusion of evidence in an unlawful sexual contact
case based on Rule 412, since "the better approach in determining
admissibility of contradictory statements is for the trial court to con-
sider admissibility in terms of probative value versus prejudicial ef-
fect and relevancy as addressed in M.R.EVid. 401-403. ' 243 In State v.
White,' Rule 412 was not applied despite the fact that the defend-
ant was charged with both unlawful sexual contact and gross sexual
misconduct. The court was faced with the conflict of applying Rule
412 to the evidence with respect to the gross sexual misconduct
charge, and applying rules of "relevance and impeachment" to the
same evidence with respect to the unlawful sexual contact charge.245
Nevertheless, Rule 412 could have been applied directly to the gross
240. See State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146 (Me. 1993).
241. Note that in State v. Philbrick the Law Court excluded evidence that the
victim was a prostitute because it was not relevant to her consent. State v. Philbrick,
551 A.2d 847, 850-51 (Me. 1988). The exclusion was based mainly on the defend-
ant's failure to provide an adequate offer of proof that the evidence was specific
evidence of consensual sexual relations with the victim prostitute, which would have
fallen under the exception of Rule 412(b)(2). See id. at 851.
242. ME. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184.
243. State v. Leonard, 513 A.2d 1352, 1355 (Me. 1986).
244. 456 A.2d 13 (Me. 1983).
245. Id. at 14.
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sexual misconduct charge and by analogy to the unlawful sexual
contact charge, rather than being completely ignored. The amend-
ments that extended the scope of the Rule to include unlawful sex-
ual contact charges terminated this double standard and prevented
courts from ignoring the rationale of Rule 412 in unlawful sexual
contact cases.
Courts are reluctant to give Rule 412 the full force of its intended
meaning, and often needlessly rely on Rule 403 or Rule 611 when
Rule 412 applies directly. In White, the Law Court did not utilize
Rule 412 to uphold the trial court's exclusion of evidence of the vic-
tim's prior abuse allegations.2 Instead, the court relied on Rule
611 to allow the trial court discretion in limiting cross-examination
to "protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. '" z47
In State v. Day,m the same issue was presented and the Law Court
again employed Rule 611 alone.249 Moreover, in State v. Gagne,-l
the Law Court limited evidence of possible prior abusers of the vic-
tim, employing the Rule 403 balancing test, and never mentioning
Rule 412.21 Fmally, in Adams, the court, although alluding to the
fact that both Rules 403 and 412 applied, excluded the evidence of
past sexual acts of the victim with others solely on the basis of Rule
403 considerations.3 2
The Advisory Committee's Note states that "Rule 403 does apply
even to evidence made specifically admissible by Rule 412," imply-
ing that Rule 412 should be considered before Rule 403.3 Rule
412 should be employed when it applies directly to exclude the evi-
dence, without forcing the trial judge to perform a Rule 403 balanc-
ing test which may or may not exclude the evidence.
246. See id. at 15.
247. Mu. R. EvED. 611(a).
248. 538 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1988) (limiting the defendant in his cross-examination of
the child victim on the issue of prior allegations of sexual abuse she had made
against others). Note that in this case, the defendant was charged with unlawful
sexual contact, and the Rule had not yet been amended to apply directly to unlawful
sexual contact cases. Nevertheless, Rule 412 could have been applied by analogy.
249. See id. at 1167-68.
250. 544 A.2d 795 (Me. 1989) (precluding cross-examination by the defendant of
the child victim about others who may have abused her around the time of the al-
leged abuse by the defendant).
251. See id. at 796.
252. State v. Adams, 544 A.2d 299, 301 (Me. 1988). In State v. Albert, the Law
Court noted that even if the defendant had shown that the evidence was admissible
under one of Rule 412's exceptions, Rule 403 would have been applied, and might
have kept the evidence out. State v. Albert, 495 A.2d 1242, 1243-44 (Me. 1935).
This may reflect the Law Court's increasing level of comfort with Rule 412 and a
willingness to employ it before Rule 403, in contrast to prior cases. Of course, in
State v. Albert, the statement was dictum since the court had already found no obvi-
ous error in the exclusion of the evidence. See itL at 1243.
253. Mrn. 1L EviD. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184.
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2. Suggestions for Textual Improvements to the Rule
There are a few legitimate criticisms of Rule 412 and its applica-
tion. By stating that the exceptions constitute the "only evidence of
a victim's past sexual behavior" which is admissible, the Rule is mis-
leading. -4 There are other circumstances in which such evidence is
admissible, explicitly referred to in the Advisory Committee's Note:
first, where the prosecution has opened the door on the victim's sex-
ual history, and second, where the presumption of childhood naivet6
has been triggered.2 55 If the prosecution is permitted to bring in evi-
dence that Rule 412 specifically prohibits the defendant from bring-
ing in, 56 the Rule should so reflect.
Furthermore, the Rule should provide guidance on the applica-
tion of the second exception specified in the Rule, when instances of
sexual relations between the victim and the defendant are admissi-
ble. In State v. Beckwith,257 a pre-Rule decision, and in Pierce v.
State," 8 a post-Rule decision, the Court concluded that such evi-
dence was admissible to prove the relations between the victim and
the defendant. The mandate of Beckwith and Pierce is unsupport-
able, and should be explicitly rejected. In Pierce, although evidence
of a continuing abusive relationship between the defendant and the
victim was offered by the prosecution to show continuing abuse, it
was considered by the court to be past acts of the defendant. More-
over, the evidence was determined to be admissible despite Rule
404(b)'s prohibition against past acts offered to prove a character
trait, because the evidence was offered to show the defendant's in-
tent and opportunity.259 The court ignored the fact that the evi-
dence was also evidence of the victim's sexual history, and that Rule
412 should have been activated, whether or not the exception al-
lowed the evidence. Even more troubling is the following statement
in Pierce: "Evidence that the defendant engaged in sexual activity
with the victim named in the indictment, whether prior to or subse-
254. Ma. R. Evr. 412(b).
255. Although Rule 412 has limited the childhood naivetd presumption as stated
in Jacques, the presumption of naivet6 continues to be triggered when a child exhib-
its extraordinary sexual knowledge for his or her age. Although Rule 412 does not
appear to be the direct cause of this limitation on the presumption of childhood
naivetd, it very well may have given the Law Court pause to consider the conflict
stated in Jacques. It is unclear from the Rule by what standard the child's knowl-
edge should be judged, and how judges should make those determinations.
256. See State v. Nadeau, 653 A.2d 408 (Me. 1995); State v. Leonard, 513 A.2d
1352 (Me. 1986).
257. 158 Me. 174, 180 A.2d 605 (1962).
258. 463 A.2d 756 (Me. 1983).
259. See id. at 761. This case can be compared to Doe, discussed in supra Part InI,
in which the court treated facts of the victim's sexual history within the knowledge
of the defendant as solely knowledge of the defendant, relevant to his state of mind,
and upon which Rule 412 had no bearing. See Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43,48
(4th Cir. 1981).
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quent to the alleged offense but tending to demonstrate a continuity
of the activity, was admissible to prove the relationship and mutual
disposition of the parties." 260 This statement should be clarified be-
cause it "goes somewhat beyond the narrow confines of Rule
412(b)(2).' ,261 Furthermore, "evidence of one kind of sexual behav-
ior at one point in time might not be probative of consent to another
kind of sexual act committed under other circumstances."' Thus,
the exception should be narrowly tailored to allow only evidence of
similar acts under similar circumstances. 6
Although case law makes it clear that past abuses as well as voli-
tional acts of the victim are covered by Rule 412, 4 the Rule itself
should elucidate this concept. The results of Gagne and Day, which
allowed some cross-examination of the victims about prior abuses
by others, but did not exclude the evidence completely, could thus
be avoided. In neither case did the Law Court mention Rule 412 in
its decision.
According to the Advisory Committee, a procedural mechanism
such as the one created in Federal Rule 412 was not necessary. 65
Nevertheless, the use of a procedural mechanism would be benefi-
cial in that it would create a structure for the consideration of such
evidence, allow both sides ample opportunity to foresee and prepare
for the potential admission of such evidence, and give the trial judge
adequate time to make a decision regarding admission.
3. Proposal that Justification for Rule be Fully Explored
From the Advisory Committee's Note and the application of the
Rule, it is clear that the Rule is intended to further policy objectives.
It is not a privilege, even though the victim's right to privacy is im-
plicated. And it is not a rule of relevance, judging from the fact that
no relevance rationales are offered for the Rule in the Advisory
260. Pierce v. State, 463 A2d at 761. Note that this argument was derived from
pre-rules cases Beckwith and State v. Seaburg, 154 Me. 210, 145 A.2d 550 (1958).
Because this was a case of child sexual abuse, consent was not an element; thus, the
rule as stated should have been inapplicable.
261. FmLD & MURRAY, supra note 187, § 4121, at 181. The exception in Rule
412(b)(2) allows such evidence only with regard to the victim's consent to the partic-
ular crime charged.
262. Id. § 412.2, at 180.
263. In State v. Leonard, the defendant was allowed to offer his testimony as to
the past sexual relations between himself and the victim in order to impeach her
testimony that there had been no prior abuses. Again, the evidence was admitted
despite the fact that consent was not an issue. See State v. Leonard, 513 A.2d 1352
(Me. 1986). Furthermore, in State v. Nadeau, 653 A.2d 408 (Me. 1995), the prosecu-
tion was allowed to enter the same type of evidence.
264. See State v. Hoffstadt, 652 A.2d 93 (Me. 1995); State v. Jacques, 558 A.2d
706 (Me. 1989).
265. Mn. R. Evn. 412 advisory committee's note, supra note 184.
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Committee's Note or in cases applying it. The drafters failed to rec-
ognize relevance arguments in support of the Rule.2 6
6
Not only did the drafters evade the relevance implications of the
Rule, they failed to address the confrontation between the Rule as a
policy measure and the rights of the defendant to introduce relevant
evidence. The Advisory Committee gave no guidance on the in-
tended solution to a conflict between the defendant's rights and the
government's interest in preventing the admission of the evidence.
Moreover, part of that policy was surely the protection of the vic-
tim's right to privacy. Yet the Note gives no guidance on the appro-
priate resolution of a situation in which the victim's right to privacy
conflicts with the defendant's constitutional rights.
Furthermore, if the drafters felt that the Rule reflected a strong
social policy, they could have excluded the evidence even for pur-
poses of impeachment.2 67 If the goal of Maine Rule 412 is the pro-
tection of victim-witnesses, then the Rule should be applicable
irrespective of the evidence's probative value. No matter what the
purpose, once the evidence is admitted, the victim will become sub-
ject to humiliation and embarrassment, and her privacy will have
been invaded. In addition, the Advisory Committee's Note's in-
struction that statements of the victim's sexual history may be ad-
missible to impeach is confusing. In Leonard, evidence of the
victim's statements concerning her sexual history was admissible in
order to impeach the credibility of her testimony;268 yet in Steen,
Rule 412 was not even mentioned when statements of the victim
regarding sexual history, offered to impeach her testimony, were ex-
cluded.269 Thus, it would seem that Rule 412 does cover statements
about sexual history; it is not clear, however, whether the impeach-
ment would be permissible using other evidence of the victim's sex-
ual past.
The Rule needs and deserves a relevance analysis. A person's
sexual past is not relevant to his or her likelihood of being raped or
of lying about being raped. Nor should it be subversively consid-
ered to determine whether the victim is worthy of the protection of
266. Nevertheless, some would argue that the Rule is a relevance measure, mas-
querading under the guise of policy. One treatise has commented that "Rule 412 as
written represented a policy judgment that while evidence of a victim's prior sexual
conduct might have some marginal probative force, its use nonetheless should be
confined to a few narrow exceptions." FILu & MURRAY, supra note 187, § 412.3, at
183.
267. See ME. R. Evn,. 408(b) advisory committee's note, supra note 184 (explain-
ing that exclusion of evidence of statements made in mediations of domestic rela-
tions is applicable regardless of the purpose for which it is being offered, because of
the "strong public policy" supporting the Rule); FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory commit-
tee's note (explaining that evidence of the victim's past sexual history is excluded for
all purposes, including impeachment, except those stated specifically in the Rule).
268. See State v. Leonard, 513 A.2d 1352 (Me. 1986).
269. See State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146 (Me. 1993).
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the law. Framing the Rule as a rule of relevance would alleviate the
conflict with the defendant's constitutional rights and prevent the
lax application of the Rule resulting from a lack of appreciation that
evidence of the victim's sexual history may be excludable both on
the basis of irrelevance and the basis of policy.
In summary, Maine Rule of Evidence 412 has been a powerful
tool for excluding irrelevant evidence, or relevant but highly preju-
dicial evidence, of a sexual crime victim's sexual past. The Rule
should be amended to codify the holdings regarding the "unwritten
exceptions"; a procedural mechanism should be employed; the defi-
nition of "past sexual behavior" should be clarified; and the Rule's
Advisory Committee's Note should reevaluate the justifications for
the Rule.
V. CuRRENT FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 412: THE SEXUAL
HARAssMr'r SHIELD
A. 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412
1. The Process of Amending the Rule
The extension of the Rule to civil cases was highly controversial.
The Supreme Court ultimately refused to promulgate a Judicial
Conference version of amended Rule 412 covering civil casesY'"
The United States Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court, and
responded by passing the amended version of Rule 412 itself.
In January of 1993, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, introduced the Violence Against Wo-
men Act in the United States Senate, which proposed the extension
of Rule 412 to civil cases.271 The Act also suggested the creation of
two new rules of evidence, 412A and 412B, which would mirror
Rule 412 and would apply to all criminal cases and civil cases.27
The proposed amendments to Rule 412 required that courts detail
the reasoning behind orders admitting evidence of the victim's sex-
ual history and also revised the balancing test" 3 In all three pro-
posed rules, reputation and opinion evidence was barred, and
evidence of specific instances was admissible only if the probative
value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice27 4
The Judicial Conference, via the Committees on Criminal and
Civil Rules, discovered that Congress was autonomously revising
270. See HR. REP. No. 103-250, at v-vi (1994).
271. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 39 (1993). The Act had been proposed, but not
passed, in the Senate in 1990 by Senator Biden. See Id. at 37. Senator Biden intro-
duced the Act "in response to the escalating problem of violence against women....
There are also some crimes, including rape and family violence, that disproportion-
ately burden women." See id.
272. See id. at 59.
273. See id. at 59, 89-91.
274. See id. at 89-91.
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Rule 412, and thus bypassing the Judicial Conference procedure.275
The major impetus for the Judicial Conference to begin drafting re-
visions to Rule 412 was "to forestall action by the Congress and to
avoid a bypass of the Rules Enabling Act process."276 In April of
1994, the Judicial Conference forwarded the revised rule to the
United States Supreme Court.2 77 The Rule as proposed by the Judi-
cial Conference extended the scope of the Rule to encompass civil
cases and deleted the balancing test of Rule 412,278 in favor of the
general application of the Rule 403 balancing test.
The Supreme Court adopted the revisions to the criminal applica-
tion of Rule 412 but refused to adopt the amendment to Rule 412
extending it to civil cases.27 9 Some Justices of the Supreme Court
felt "that the amendment might exceed the scope of the Court's au-
thority under the Rules Enabling Act, which forbids the enactment
of rules that 'abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.' 2 0
The Court's posture arose from fear that its holding in Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson 81 would be jeopardized. 2  In Meritor Savings
275. The Judicial Conference has a Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, which in turn has Advisory Committees on different areas of rules. See
FIELD ET AL., supra note 84, at 459. In the case of Rule 412, the Advisory Commit-
tees on Criminal Rules, Civil Rules, and the Rules of Evidence all took part at one
time or another. See Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure (Oct. 12 & 13, 1992), available in 1992 WL 694252 (W.C.U.S.), at *9;
Minutes of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Dec. 17-19, 1992),
available in 1992 WL 739926 (J.C.U.S.), at *5; Minutes of the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (June 17-19, 1993), available in 1993 WL 818942 (J.C.U.S.),
at *13. The Judicial Conference was established to provide the Supreme Court with
recommendations for creating and amending rules of procedure. See supra note 84.
The Rules of Evidence Committee was disbanded when Rule 412 was originally be-
ing revised by the Judicial Conference; the Committee was, however, recreated
before the Rule was submitted to the Supreme Court, and it made major revisions to
the drafts created by the Committees on the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. See Minutes of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure (June 17-19, 1993), available in 1993 WL 818942 (J.C.U.S.), at *14-*15.
276. Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(Dec. 17-19, 1992), available in 1992 WL 739926 (J.C.U.S.), at *5.
277. See Amendments to Federal Rules Sent to Congress by Supreme Court, 62
U.S.L.W. 1165, 1165 (May 10, 1994).
278. See 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNEr H W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5381.1, at 154 n.13 (Supp. 1996) [hereinafter WRIGHT
& GRAHAM SUPP.].
279. See H.R. Doc. No. 103-250, at v (1994). Had Congress not taken action by
December 1, 1994, the Rule, as amended by the Supreme Court, would have auto-
matically become law. See Amendments to Federal Rules Sent to Congress by
Supreme Court, 62 U.S.L.W. 1165, 1165 (May 10, 1994). The Committee on the
Rules of Evidence was disturbed that the Supreme Court rejected its proposed
amendments to Rule 412. See Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules
of Evidence (May 9, 1994), available in 1994 WL 809917 (J.C.U.S.), at *1.
280. H.R. Doc. No. 103-250, at v (1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994)).
281. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
282. See H.R. Doc. No. 103-250, at v (1994).
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Bank, a civil case concerning sexual harassment, the Supreme Court
held "that evidence of an alleged victim's 'sexually provocative
speech or dress' may be relevant in workplace harassment cases."2,8s
Additionally, the Chief Justice noted that "some Justices expressed
concern that the proposed amendment might encroach on the rights
of defendants" in sexual harassment suits. s  In April of 1994, the
Supreme Court forwarded the revised rules to Congress omitting
the civil application provision of Rule 412.a  The Committee of the
Judicial Conference responded that the proposed amendments to
Rule 412 would not disturb the Supreme Court's holding in Meritor
Savings Bank, because Rule 412 "was a fact specific rule that would
require taking [the Meritor Savings Bank] opinion into account."' ,
Thus, Congress took action to amend Rule 412 itself. The Judicial
Conference Committee's discussion with the House of Representa-
tives led to the passage in the House and Senate of an amended
Rule 412 identical to that suggested to the Supreme Court by the
Judicial Conference in August 1994,2  as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act.'
2. Summary of Amendments and Discussion of Advisory
Committee's Note
The Rule was modified in several important respects. Although
the three criminal exceptions remained virtually unchanged, 9 the
Rule was extended to include civil cases:
283. Id. (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 US. at 69).
284. Id.
285. See Amendments to Federal Rules Sent to Congress by Supreme Court, 62
U.S.L.W. 1165, 1165 (May 10, 1994).
286. Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence (May 19,
1994), available in 1994 WL 809917 (J.C.U.S.), at *1.
287. See 23 WRIGHr & GRaHbil Supp., supra note 278, § 5381.1, at 153.
288. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 13701-4223 (1994). See also New Federal Rules Are Mandated by 1994 Crime Bill,
63 U.S.L.W. 2146 (Sept. 13, 1994). The amended Rule became effective December
1, 1994. Id. at 2147.
289. The specific exceptions in the criminal provision of the Rule were modified
only slightly. Under the fast specific exception, the scope of evidence of the victim's
sexual behavior allowed to prove that the defendant was not the source of injury or
semen was slightly expanded. In addition, the permitted use of "physical evidence"
was added to the rule. The exception no longer requires that the victim's sexual
behavior be "with others." See 23 WRIGnr & Gn.AHAb Supi'., supra note 278,
§ 5388.1, at 221. Furthermore, the revised exception alters the format of the inquiry
slightly by asking whether a person other than the defendant was the source of in-
jury rather than asking whether the defendant was not the source of injury. See Id.
The second specific exception originally allowed evidence of the victim's sexual be-
havior with the defendant, amended Rule 412 allows evidence of the victim's sexual
behavior "with respect to" the defendant, which will make admissible mental behav-
ior of the victim. See id. § 5389.1, at 227. In addition, the exception was expanded
to include evidence offered by the prosecution, although the prosecution was not
limited to offering this evidence "to prove consent" as the defense was. Id
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In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior
or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it
is otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative
value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim
and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged
victim's reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in
controversy by the alleged victim.2
290. FED. R. EviD. 412(b)(2). The entire text of the amended rule is as follows:
Rule 412. Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past Sexual
Behavior or Alleged Sexual Predisposition
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not admis-
sible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual miscon-
duct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in
other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if
otherwise admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by
the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other
than the accused was the source of semen, injury or
other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by
the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of
the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove
consent or by the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior
or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is
otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's rep-
utation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by
the alleged victim.
(c) Procedure to determine admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b)
must:
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial spe-
cifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose
for which it is offered unless the court, for good cause
requires a different time for filing or permits filing dur-
ing trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged
victim or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's guard-
ian or representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must con-
duct a hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a right
to attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and the rec-
ord of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless
the court orders otherwise.
FED. R. EvnD. 412.
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The civil provision resembles the "constitutionally required" ex-
ception in criminal cases in that it applies no matter what the pur-
pose of the offered evidence?"' A balancing test is employed rather
than the enumeration of specific exceptions "in recognition of the
difficulty of foreseeing future developments in the law."'  The
Rule 412 balancing test differs substantially from the traditional bal-
ancing test in Rule 403. It places the burden on the proponent and
requires the probative value of the evidence to substantially out-
weigh its dangers, in contrast to the Rule 403 test which requires the
danger or consideration to substantially outweigh the probative
value in order for the evidence to be excluded. In addition, Rules
412 and 403 require different considerations to be taken into
account? 93
Reputation and opinion evidence, although not expressly barred,
is precluded because the only exceptions require evidence of specific
acts. Therefore, reputation and opinion evidence is implicitly
barred "in recognition of the limited probative value and dubious
reliability of evidence of reputation or evidence in the form of an
opinion."29
The confusing and controversial clause "notwithstanding any
other provision of law" was removed. It was replaced with "if other-
wise admissible," indicating that evidence can only be admitted
under the Rule's exceptions if it is admissible under other rules of
evidence.295 Thus, Rule 412 can no longer be construed as out-
weighing all other evidentiary rules.
When discussing the reason for extending the Rule to all criminal
cases, the Committee felt it was explanation enough to note that the
reason was "obvious. 29 6 When explaining the reasoning behind the
addition of a clause for civil cases, the Committee felt that the ra-
tionale was "equally obvious." 2' The reasoning is not altogether
obvious, however, because sexual harassment is different from rape.
Nevertheless, the application of a sexual harassment shield logically
parallels the rape shield rule because evidence of the victim's sexual
291. See 23 WiGr & GAHNtis Supp., supra note 278, § 5389.2, at 230.
292. FED. R. Evm. 412(b) advisory committee's note.
293. Compare FED. R. EvID. 412, with FED. R. EviD. 403. Rule 403 lists the
considerations to be balanced against probative value as "danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or ... undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R Evm. 403. On the other
hand, Rule 412 requires only "the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair preju-
dice to any party" to be considered. FED. R. EvnD. 412(b)(2).
294. FED. R. Evm. 412(b) advisory committee's note.
295. FED. R. EviD. 412(a).
296. FED. K. EvD. 412 advisory committee's note. The Rule still does not ex-
clude evidence of the victim's sexual history in criminal cases for crimes other than
sexual crimes, even if a sexual crime occurred during the commission of the charged
crime.
297. Id.
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history is often utilized in the same manner at trial and discovery as
it is in rape trials. 2
98
The Advisory Committee's Note does, however, illuminate the
meanings of "past sexual behavior" and "sexual predisposition."
"Past sexual behavior" includes "all activities that involve actual
physical conduct, i.e., sexual intercourse and sexual contact. ''299 In
addition, "sexual behavior" encompasses "activities of the mind,
such as fantasies [or] dreams."3"0 "Sexual predisposition," on the
other hand, means "evidence that does not directly refer to sexual
activities or thoughts but that the proponent believes may have a
sexual connotation for the factfinder." 1  Significantly, the Note ex-
plains that evidence "relating to the alleged victim's mode of dress,
speech, or lifestyle will not be admissible" because it is evidence of
"sexual predisposition."3" This statement foreshadowed the Rule's
interference with the holding of Mentor Savings Bank.3"3
Although the procedures specified in the Rule, requiring an in
camera hearing after a written motion, do not apply directly to dis-
covery, the Advisory Committee's Note directs courts to consider
the Rule's policy of protecting victims when ruling on protective or-
ders and requests for confidentiality in discovery proceedings.30 4
Therefore, "[c]ourts should presumptively issue protective orders
barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes a show-
ing that the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant
under the facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be
obtained except through discovery. 3 5
3. Advisory Committee's Justification for the Amended Rule
With the 1994 Amendments, the first Advisory Committee's Note
to ever accompany the Rule was published. The purposes of the
amendments, according to the Note, were "to diminish some of the
confusion engendered by the original rule and to expand the protec-
tion afforded alleged victims of sexual misconduct., 30 6 Further-
298. See Paul Nicholas Monnin, Special Project, Proving Welcomeness: The Ad-
missibility of Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the
1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412,48 VAND. L. REv. 1155, 1180-84
(1995).
299. FED. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Note that the criminal provision of the Rule excludes evidence of both "sex-
ual behavior" and "sexual predisposition," although its exceptions refer only to acts
of "sexual behavior." Therefore, to be admissible in a criminal case, "sexual predis-
position" evidence would have to fall under the "constitutionally required"
exception.
304. See id.
305. Id.
306. Id. (emphasis added).
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more, the Rule purports "to safeguard the alleged victim against the
invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyp-
ing that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details
and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding process."'
The Committee reinforced the Rule's policy of "shielding the al-
leged victim from potential embarrassment and safeguarding the vic-
tim against stereotypical thinking."'  And again, the Committee
referred to "[t]he strong social policy of protecting a victim's privacy
and encouraging victims to come forward to report criminal acts.""'
Repeatedly, words of protection and policy are used to explain the
theory of the Rule, even though the title of the Rule is "Sex Offense
Cases; Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past Sexual Behavior or Al-
leged Sexual Predisposition."310 The relevance of the evidence is
not discussed in the Advisory Committee's Note. Instead, the Rule
continues to be based mainly on the policy objectives of protecting
the privacy of the victim, preventing the misuse of the evidence, and
encouraging victims to report sexual assaults.
In addition, the Advisory Committee's Note states that evidence,
even if admissible by a rule such as Rule 402, which allows only the
presentation of relevant evidence, might be barred by Rule 412.31
The selection of Rule 402 as a point of illumination, indicates that
the Committee regarded some evidence of the victim's sexual his-
tory as relevant, but preferred that the basis of the bar be the policy
considerations of Rule 412.
The framing of the Rule as a policy measure opens the door to
claims of unconstitutional application in criminal cases. Critics ar-
gue the extension of the Rule to civil cases subverts defendants' con-
stitutional rights.31 The Advisory Committee's Note explains the
"constitutionally required" exception with this example:
"[S]tatements in which the victim has expressed an intent to have
sex with the first person encountered on a particular occasion might
not be excluded without violating the due process right of a rape
defendant seeking to prove consent." 31 3 The Committee's choice of
an example of a victim's statement rather than an actual sexual act
of the victim is noteworthy. Furthermore, the example chosen re-
lates the evidence to a defense of consent, already covered under
307. Id.
308. Id. (emphasis added).
309. Id. (emphasis added). The Advisory Committee's Note clarified that if the
crime or claim did not involve sexual misconduct, Rule 412 would not apply. How-
ever, the Note explained, the witness will "be protected" by other rules, for example
Rules 403 and 404. See id. The Committee's choice of the words "be protected"
further portrayed its view that the Rule is one of policy and not relevance.
310. FED. R. Evm. 412 (emphasis added).
311. See FED. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note.
312. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 771.
313. FED. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note.
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one of the specific exceptions. Therefore, although the Committee
did touch upon the conflict between the defendant's right to com-
pulsory process and the Rule, the example given provides little gui-
dance. Furthermore, the Committee gave no guidance as to the
appropriate resolution of any conflict between Rule 412 and the de-
fendant's right to confront witnesses against him.
With regard to civil cases, the application of a balancing test indi-
cates that some evidence is relevant; otherwise, there is no probative
value to weigh. The Advisory Committee's Note explained that,
"[iln an action for sexual harassment, for instance, while some evi-
dence of the alleged victim's sexual behavior and/or predisposition
in the workplace may perhaps be relevant, non-work place conduct
will usually be irrelevant.,314 The Committee gave no guidance on
the rule of relevance in sexual harassment cases, but instead tread
lightly around this important issue, using the language "may
perhaps. ' 315
In summary, the Rule drafters adopted the revisions for the same
policy reasons that the Rule was originally enacted: to protect the
victim and to encourage the reporting of sexual assaults and sexual
harassment. The Committee skirted the potential confrontation be-
tween the Rule and the holding of Meritor Savings Bank, as well as
the issue of the relevance value of the excluded evidence. By
neglecting to assert a relevance theory for the Rule (that the Rule
excludes only wholly irrelevant evidence), the drafters implicitly as-
serted a belief that the evidence has some relevance. Thus, the
drafters effectively preserved the stereotypes they claimed to be
seeking to avoid. If the evidence has any relevance, it must be to
the issue of consent or the victim's credibility, the common law ba-
ses for admitting the evidence. If the evidence is relevant to con-
sent, it must be because a woman's consent to sexual relations with
one person is relevant to her consent with another. If the evidence
is relevant to the victim's credibility, then it must be because sexual
character is linked to character for honesty. These rationales flow
from stereotypes and gender-based assumptions about sexuality that
the Rule was supposedly intended to avoid.
B. The Implications of a Sexual Harassment Shield
1. Elements of Sexual Harassment as Characterized by Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson
The extension of the Rule to civil cases has greatly impacted sex-
ual harassment claims made under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.316 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on
314. Id. (emphasis added).
315. Id.
316. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
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the basis of race, color, gender, religious, or national origin in em-
ployment hiring and practices.3 17 The "gender" category was added
to Title VII during last minute deliberations on the Civil Rights Act,
as "something of an accident, at best."31 Sexual harassment was
first recognized as a valid Title VII claim in federal courts in 1976.319
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, decided by the Supreme Court in
1986, is the seminal sexual harassment case; it marked the first time
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of sexual harassment claims
under Title VII.1 Meritor Savings Bank confirmed that sexual har-
assment can arise in two forms: quid pro quo harassment, when job
benefits or compensation are conditioned on submission to sexual
advances, and hostile environment harassment, when an employee
is subjected to demeaning statements or degrading conduct due to
his or her gender.32'
In Meritor Savings Bank, the Supreme Court held that both forms
of sexual harassment rely on an "unwelcomeness" standard3 22 The
conduct constituting the sexual harassment must be unwelcome in
two senses: a reasonable person would have found the advances un-
welcome and the victim in particular did not welcome the ad-
317. The Act reads, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
318. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAr. L. Rnv. 813, 816 (1991). In fact, the
gender category was added in an effort to defeat the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See
id. at 816-17. It appears that this affects some courts' views of the worth of sexual
discrimination or sexual harassment claims. In Meritor Savings Bank, the Supreme
Court noted that, "[t]he prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added
to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives," and
even relayed some of the arguments against including sex. Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986).
319. See D. Kelly Weisberg, Introduction, in APpIcAToNs OF FmaxNIs1 LEGAL
THEORY To WoimN's LrvEs: SEx, VioL.ENcE, WORK, AND REPRODUCTiON 725, 729
(D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996). The first federal court case to recognize sexual har-
assment was Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
320. See Sloan, supra note 94, at 378.
321. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65. The plaintiff in Meritor
Savings Bank claimed that her supervisor had harassed her by suggesting "that they
go to a motel to have sexual relations," and by making "demands upon her for sex-
ual favors ... both during and after business hours"; he also "fondled her in front of
other employees, followed her into the women's restroom when she went there
alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions." Id.
at 60. The district court had considered only the quid pro quo form of sexual harass-
ment, and neglected to reflect on whether a hostile environment had been created.
See id. at 62. The Court of Appeals noted this as one of its reasons for remanding
the case. See id.
322. See ri. at 68.
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vances.323 Furthermore, the Court found that "[t]he correct inquiry
is whether the respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged
sexual advances were unwelcome." 3 The Supreme Court noted
the district court's determination that the plaintiff's sexual interac-
tion with her supervisor was "voluntary" and therefore denied relief
to the plaintiff.3' The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the district court's decision, remarking in a footnote
that the victim's "dress and personal fantasies" were irrelevant, even
though testimony on the subject was allowed at trial. 26 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals's decision, while
strongly disagreeing with the Court of Appeals on the relevance of
the victim's dress and personal fantasies.327
In defining the elements of a sexual harassment claim, the Court
relied on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines in requiring a showing of "unwelcomeness." 32 In a since
oft-quoted phrase, the Court stated that "[t]he gravamen of any sex-
ual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'un-
welcome.'"329 It went on to evaluate the relevance of the victim's
dress and personal fantasies, even though it was not necessary to do
so. The Court held that "a complainant's sexually provocative
speech or dress ... is obviously relevant."330
In making abundantly clear that dress and speech of the victim
may be relevant in a sexual harassment claim, the Supreme Court
articulated a theory of relevance, but did not give lower courts gui-
323. The objective standard has been criticized because it merely reflects the
judgment of the dominant male class. See Weisberg, supra note 319, at 730, 756.
The subjective standard has also been sharply criticized, because it focuses the in-
quiry on the victim's behavior and state of mind. Id.
324. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68.
325. See id. at 61.
326. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Court of
Appeals decision stated that:
The District Court did not elaborate on its basis for the finding of involun-
tariness, but it may have considered the voluminous testimony regarding
Vinson's dress and personal fantasies.... Since .... a woman does not
waive her Title VII rights by her sartorial or whimsical proclivities.... that
testimony had no place in this litigation.
Id.
327. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69. Note that the Supreme
Court manipulated the language and reference in the Court of Appeals decision
from "dress and personal fantasies" to "sexually provocative speech or dress," even
though "speech" is an entirely different matter from "personal fantasies," and "sexu-
ally provocative" was not the characterization used by the Court of Appeals.
328. See id. at 65-68 (referring to the EEOC Guidelines at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(1985)).
329. Id. at 68.
330. Id. at 69.
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dance on the proper application of the theory.331 As a result, some
lower courts have interpreted the "proclamation of relevance in
[Meritor Savings Bank] to be a strong argument in favor of auto-
matic admission and consideration of evidence concerning the plain-
tiff's conduct. '332 Since Meritor Savings Bank, the evidence
admitted by lower courts includes photographs of the plaintiff nude,
lunches shared by plaintiff and defendant, personal notes from
plaintiff to the defendant, and even sexual jokes made by the plain-
tiff to others. 333
The application of the "unwelcomeness" standard has drawn
much criticism, namely the subjective strand of the standard (that
the victim personally felt the advances to be unwelcome). 334 The
Supreme Court's strong emphasis that the conduct of the victim was
the best indicator of whether the advances were unwelcome has
been sharply criticized because the victim's conduct becomes "the
yardstick by which we measure assent.13 s The standard focuses the
inquiry on the victim. Often such an inquiry incorporates the vic-
tim's clothing, dress, sexual predisposition, and even sexual activities
unrelated to work.3 36
The "unwelcomeness" standard in sexual harassment parallels the
consent element in rape and sexual assault, because it focuses on the
victim.337 The standard may go so far as to lead to a situation where
a plaintiff with a substantial sexual history is held to be so ex-
perienced that she can withstand any work environment with-
out being offended, while a plaintiff with no sexual history is
vulnerable to attack from the defendant for being too sensitive
to what most would consider an acceptable and harmless work
environment. 3 8
2. Rule 412's Overlay on the "Unwelcomeness" Standard
Does the civil provision of Rule 412 restrict the standard of rele-
vance espoused in Meritor Savings Bank, or overturn the decision
331. See Sloan, supra note 94, at 384. "[B]ecause this statement is not a definitive
standard for admitting evidence, the lower courts have had to interpret it and create
standards for themselves." Id
332. Id.
333. See Ud.
334. Although some courts interpreted Meritor Savings Bank as allowing in-
creased admissibility of evidence of the victim's sexual predisposition, others re-
stricted the use of such evidence despite Meritor Savings Bank. See id. at 38889.
335. Estrich, supra note 318, at 828.
336. The "unwelcomeness" standard also "presupposes that harassers and their
victims are motivated by sexual attraction," and it fails to recognize that sexual har-
assment embodies power differentials rather than sexual attraction. See Monnin,
supra note 298, at 1155, 1178.
337. In effect, "the unwelcomeness requirement performs the doctrinal dirty
work of the consent standard in rape law." Estrich, supra note 318, at 830.
338. Sloan, supra note 94, at 382.
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completely, as the Supreme Court feared? Some believe that the
exclusion of evidence of "sexual predisposition" in Rule 412 was in-
tended "to modify if not to reverse the Supreme Court's decision in
the Meritor" case.339 It is possible that amended Rule 412 creates a
presumption of irrelevance for evidence of sexual predisposition,
which Meitor Savings Bank deemed to be "obviously relevant." 0
Another inquiry must precede the question of whether amended
Rule 412 modifies Mertor Savings Bank. Is Rule 412 one of rele-
vance or of policy? Because the holding in Meitor Savings Bank is
based on a relevance rationale, then a policy expounded by Rule 412
might not conflict with the Meritor Savings Bank holding. Policy
considerations are sometimes subverted to allow the introduction of
evidence relevant to the defendant's defense. If the Rule is primar-
ily policy, the evidence may still be constitutionally excluded, but
the court must weigh competing interests and find that the state's
legitimate interest in protecting victims outweighs the defendant's
constitutional right to confront his accuser. "[T]he pertinent inquiry
in resolving this conflict is whether the benefit gained by advancing
the interests of rape shield statutes is arbitrary and disproportionate
when compared to the detrimental effect on the defendant's right to
examine a witness's motive to fabricate."'"
On the other hand, if amended Rule 412 is based primarily on a
theory of relevance, then it may effectively modify the Meritor Sav-
ings Bank standard. If the amended Rule creates a new standard of
relevance, then it excludes, as irrelevant, evidence of the victim's
speech and dress which Meritor deemed "obviously relevant," and
directly conflicts with the Meritor Savings Bank holding. 1 2 Even if
amended Rule 412 doesn't completely overrule Meitor Savings
Bank, it modifies it because "it requires courts to enunciate [the
Meritor Savings Bank relevance] logic more carefully and to con-
sider the prejudice of stereotypical thinking when engaging in the
balancing mandated by Revised Rule 412(b)(2)." 3
Because the civil portion of the Rule creates a balancing test, the
Rule permits an absolute subversion of Meitor Savings Bank in the
individual application of that test. The Rule creates a vehicle by
which judges, based on the particular facts of a case, may choose to
impose the Meritor Savings Bank standard or bypass it. If the latter
occurs, then "[a]rmed with a presumption against admissibility and
339. 23 Wmr' & GRAHAM Supp., supra note 278, § 5385.1, at 194. The Judicial
Conference Committee, however, claimed that it did not intend for amended Rule
412 to overrule Meritor Savings Bank. See Minutes of the Advisory Committee on
Federal Rules of Evidence (May 9, 1994), available in 1994 WL 809917, at *1
(J.C.U.S.).
340. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vimson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
341. Price, supra note 161, at 561.
342. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69.
343. 23 WRGrHT & GRAHAM Supp., supra note 278, § 5385.1, at 194.
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the reverse balancing test, new Rule 412 will turn the focus of a
sexual harassment suit away from the prior sexual conduct of the
plaintiff and back towards the defendant and the particular incidents
of the defendant's sexual advances in question."S
C. Application of the Amended Rule
1. In the Criminal Context
Amended Rule 412 has been applied in criminal cases to exclude
evidence of the victim's sexual history. For example, in United
States v. Roman, 5 evidence of the victim's sexual history with per-
sons other than the defendant was excluded. The court found that
such defense evidence was "an attempt to illustrate indirectly to the
trial jury the complainant's alleged sexual behavior in the distant
past with individuals other than the defendant, thereby damaging
her credibility."
In United States v. Alexander, 7 the defendant was limited in his
cross-examination of the victim-witness regarding prior inconsistent
statements about her sexual history. The appeals court found the
evidence did not fall within one of Rule 412's specific exceptions,
and was therefore properly excluded; moreover, such exclusion did
not create a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights since
his main purpose was to attack the credibility of the victim 34s Be-
cause he was allowed full cross-examination into the victim's charac-
ter for dishonesty, his constitutional rights were not violated.3 9
2. In the Civil Context
The new civil section of Rule 412 has had a major impact on civil
claims through its direct application in trials and its application by
analogy to discovery proceedings.5 0 The Advisory Committee's
Note to the Rule, acknowledging that the Rule cannot apply directly
to discovery proceedings, instructs that its rationale be employed in
discovery.35' The Note states:
344. Sloan, supra note 94, at 401.
345. 884 F. Supp. 124 (SD.N.Y. 1995).
346. Id. at 125. The court excluded evidence of a paternity test, which the de-
fendant hoped to use to attack the victim's credibility. Id.
347. No. 94-10568, 1996 WL 19179 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 1996).
348. See id. at *4.
349. See id.
350. Critics have argued that "despite all the hoo-rah about protecting the pri-
vacy of victims, revised Rule 412 does nothing about the most serious forms of abuse
in civil cases; that is, discovery into intimate details of the plaintiff's sexual history by
defendants bent on harassing her into dropping her suit," because it does not apply
directly to discovery. 23 WpiGHm & GRAH-Xm SUPP., supra note 278, § 5393.1, at 250
(footnote omitted).
351. See FED. PL EvI. 412 advisory committee's note.
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In order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412, however,
courts should enter appropriate orders pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) to protect the victim against unwarranted
inquiries and to ensure confidentiality. Courts should pre-
sumptively issue protective orders barring discovery unless the
party seeking discovery makes a showing that the evidence
sought to be discovered would be relevant under the facts and
theories of the particular case, and cannot be obtained except
through discovery.352
Issues regarding admissibility of the victim's sexual history have
generally been decided in the context of discovery motions and mo-
tions under Rule 412. The Rule requires that evidence of a victim's
sexual history be presented in a written motion at least fourteen
days prior to trial if it is going to be offered into evidence. 53
Rule 412 has been employed to prevent discovery of the victim's
sexual history in sexual harassment cases.3 54 For example, in Barta
v. City & County of Honolulu,3 5 the plaintiff, alleging sexual harass-
ment by her employer, was granted a discovery motion to prevent
discovery of her sexual conduct outside the workplace. In prevent-
ing discovery of non-workplace conduct, the court was guided by the
understanding that "[a]lthough Rule 412 is a rule controlling the ad-
missibility of evidence rather than its discoverability, Rule 412 must
inform the proper scope of discovery in this case."'356 Although the
order protected information about the plaintiff's off-duty sexual
352. Id. Some states require a good cause showing to discover information about
the victim's sexual history, via a statute or rule of civil procedure. See 23 WUorr &
GRAHAM Supp., supra note 278, § 5393.1, at 250 (footnote omitted).
353. See FED. R. Evn. 412(c).
354. Many courts have also prohibited discovery of the victim's sexual history in
cases where Rule 412 was not directly applicable. In Janopoulos v. Harvey Walner &
Assocs., No. 93 C 5176, 1995 WL 107170 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 1995), the plaintiff in a
sexual harassment claim moved that any evidence of her marital history be pro-
tected from discovery. See id at *1. The court, in excluding the evidence, did not
employ Rule 412 in its ruling, however, but instead applied Rules 401 and 402. See
id. at *2. It found that the plaintiff's marital history was not per se evidence of
sexual history and therefore was not within the ambit of Rule 412. See Id. at *1.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the evidence should be excluded because it
found that "no fact at issue in this case will be more or less probable than it would
be without evidence regarding the plaintiff's marital history," and the evidence thus
had zero relevance. Id. at *2. In Stalnaker v. KMart Corp., No. CIV.A.95-2444-
GTV, 1996 WL 397563 (D. Kan. July 11, 1996), the Rule was utilized by the defend-
ant, who moved to prevent the plaintiff from asking non-party witnesses about their
prior romantic or sexual activities. The court found that Rule 412 did not apply
directly because the information was not going to be used against "victims" but
rather against the defendant, see id at *2, and it did not apply directly during discov-
ery proceedings. See id at *3. The court ruled that the plaintiff was allowed to ask
non-parties about prior sexual harassment by the defendant because that was not
"voluntary" sexual conduct by the non-parties, which would be the only protection
afforded by the application of Rule 412 by analogy. See Id. at *4.
355. 169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Haw. 1996).
356. Id. at 135.
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conduct, the defendant was nonetheless allowed to inquire about
the plaintiffs social contacts and the identity of persons with whom
the plaintiff may have had sexual contact, because "[s]uch discovery
efforts appear reasonably calculated to lead to the identity of indi-
viduals who have relevant information and other appropriate pur-
poses towards resolution of Plaintiffs claims."5 7
In Sanchez v. Zabihi,5 s the defendants sought a court order com-
pelling the plaintiff to testify to her sexual past, based on their de-
fense that the victim was actually the aggressor. The defendants
"essentially defend[ed] this action by claiming that [the] Plaintiff
[could not] show that the sexual harassing behavior was unwel-
come."31 The defendants sought to ask the plaintiff about any sex-
ual relations she had with co-workers in the ten years prior to the
incident alleged. The court applied Rule 412 and ordered that the
questions be answered by the plaintiff, but with the limitation that
the questions cover only the three years prior to the sexual harass-
ment alleged3 60
The exclusion of evidence of the victim's sexual history has also
been employed as a sanction for not complying with Rule 412's no-
tice requirement? 1 In Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co.,'
the defendant had not complied with the requirement of Rule
412(c) that evidence of a party's sexual history be kept under seal. 6
As a sanction for that violation, the court excluded the evidence of
the victim's participation in discussions of sexual matters at work,
never reaching the relevance argument regarding the evidence.314
When applied in Arno v. Club Med, Inc, Rule 412 required the
exclusion of the victim's dress when offered by the defendant, be-
cause the trial court determined that the dress was being offered to
show the victim's sexual predisposition ' The defendant claimed
to be offering the evidence to show specifically that the victim had
357. Id. at 137.
358. 166 F.R.D. 500 (D.N.M. 1996).
359. Id. at 501.
360. See id. at 502.
361. It remains unclear whether exclusion of evidence due to a defendant's fail-
ure to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of Rule 412 would consti-
tute a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court ruled in Taylor Y. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400 (1988), that the exclusion of evidence as a sanction for violations of the
discovery process was not an infringement upon the constitutional rights of the de-
fendant; nevertheless, that decision can be distinguished from rape shield rule cases
because in Taylor the issue was the introduction of a witness, not a particular piece
of evidence, and in Taylor the violation was a discovery violation, not a violation of
an evidence rule's notice or hearing requirement.
362. 895 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Va. 1995).
363. See ld at 107.
364. See id. at 109.
365. Civ. No. 89-20656 SW, 1995 WL 380124 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 1995).
366. See id. at *3.
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to assist the defendant in taking the victim's clothes off during the
incident in question.36 7
In Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co.,31 the court ruled on specific
questions asked in the defendant's deposition of the plaintiff. The
first question asked whether the victim was using birth control at the
time of the alleged assault.3 69 The plaintiff had already testified in
her deposition that she was not using birth control on the date of the
assault.370 The court found that although proof that the victim was
lying would factor into her credibility, the evidence was excludable
because if it were introduced, it could lead the jury "to conclude that
because the plaintiff used birth control methods, she consented to,
or even invited, the defendant's conduct. '371
However, Rule 412 has not always adequately prevented the dis-
covery of evidence of the victim's sexual history. For example, in
Alberts, the defendant was allowed to depose the plaintiff on the
issue of whether or not she had condoms in her glove compartment
several weeks after the alleged assault.3 72 The reason the court gave
for allowing this discovery was that if indeed there were condoms in
her glove compartment at that time, the only way the defendant
would have known about them was if he were invited to view the
new stereo in her car, as he alleged, and saw the condoms at that
time.373 The court offered a precarious link to relevance: that if the
plaintiff invited the defendant to view her stereo system just a few
months later, it somehow proved that the plaintiff was not as trau-
matized by the alleged sexual assault as she claimed. 4
367. See id Although the trial court found that "the probative value of [the vic-
tim's] clothing was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to [the victim]" and
the defendant was not allowed to bring up the evidence in his case in chief, the court
allowed the defendant to cross-examine the victim on the issue of her clothing and
"how it was removed." Id This contradiction was not explained in the Appeals
Court decision. See Arno v. Club Med Inc., 22 F.3d 1464 (9th Cir. 1994).
368. No. 93-C4397, 1995 WL 117886 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1995).
369. See id. at *1.
370. See id. at *2.
371. Id. at *2. The question was asked by the defendant on the basis that
the plaintiff alleges that on the night in question the defendant James Crew,
after being allowed into her hotel room attempted to force the plaintiff to
have sexual intercourse with him. During the incident, the plaintiff has
testified that she told him, in an attempt to dissuade him, that she did not
have any birth control available to her at that time.
Id. at *6 n.1.
372. See id. at *3.
373. See id.
374. See id. The court went on to state, "[p]roof of this type would allow the
defendants a strong argument to the jury that the plaintiff, Susan Alberts could not
possibly have been as traumatized as she now claims to be .... A person so trauma-
tized would not place herself in such a position." Id The court assumed that if the
defendant was correct, that the victim had condoms in her glove compartment, it
would prove that the victim invited the defendant to her home. Furthermore, the
court ignored the possibility that the defendant could prove his visit to the victim's
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Finally, the Alberts court allowed the defendant to question the
plaintiff about her sexual behavior with others following the as-
sault.37 The court allowed the question because the plaintiff in-
cluded in her damages claim the fact that she had trouble
experiencing sexual intimacy after the attack.37 6 The court's tenu-
ous rationale for allowing this question was that Rule 412 prohibits
only "evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in
other sexual behavior" in contrast to the evidence sought, which was
"testimony by [the victim] that she did not engage in other sexual
behavior."31 The court employed the analogy of the prosecution
opening the door, by outlining her damages the plaintiff had sub-
jected herself to intrusive discovery of her sexual past. Conse-
quently, the defendant, in the eyes of the court, had a right to obtain
and to utilize this evidence fully. The court stated:
Having chosen to inject into the proceedings her present in-
ability to engage in certain types of behavior, plaintiff cannot
now claim the protection of Rule 412... in order to bar the
defendant from seeking discovery of facts that would rebut her
claim in the most traditional, basic and fundamental of ways-
by proving that it is simply not true."78
Courts have also employed Rule 412 when deciding defendants'
motions to compel plaintiffs to answer questions about their sexual
history. In Ramirez v. Nabil's, Inc.,3" 9 the defendants in a sexual
harassment suit persuaded the court to compel discovery of the
plaintiffs' medical records, even though they contained information
about the victims' sexual history.8 0 The court viewed the informa-
tion in the records as relevant to the victims' claims of damages for
emotional distress and self-esteem losses, and allowed the discov-
ery.8 1 The court also noted that the plaintiffs had "proferred no
home without necessarily referring to the condoms in the glove compartment of her
car.
375. Id. at *5.
376. See id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). The court was unphased that the defendant
would explore the victim's sexual behavior since the attack. Indeed, the court per-
mitted the defendant to allege that the victim was not truly having sexual intimacy
problems by offering evidence of every sexual encounter the victim had since the
attack.
379. No. Civ.A. 94-2396-GTV, 1995 VL 609415 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995).
380. See id. at *3.
381. See id. The court provided little analysis of why the information was discov-
erable, but did note that "the requests for the medical records and other information
appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regard-
ing the claims of emotional distress by [the plaintiffs] and possibly. .. sexual
propensities." Id.
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adequate reason for barring the discovery."3 82
In Botomly v. Leucadia National,3as the court permitted the de-
fendant in a sexual harassment suit to discover the plaintiff's medi-
cal and psychological records, even though the records contained
evidence of her sexual history. The issue again revolved around the
plaintiffs asserted damages, which "opened the door" to the de-
fendant discovering and utilizing information about her sexual
past.384 The court noted:
Although, plaintiff, by putting her psychological and emo-
tional condition in issue waives privacy claims as to those mat-
ters which are related to causation and damages as to her
claim, plaintiff does not waive privacy interests on matters that
are unrelated to the case or not calculated to lead to admissi-
ble evidence.3 s
Nevertheless, the plaintiff lost the right to protect her medical and
psychological reports, which the court considered might lead to ad-
missible evidence.a86
The plaintiff in Blackmon v. Bucknerls made a claim against jail
officials stemming from a sexual assault he suffered in jail. The
court granted the defendants' Rule 412 motion to offer evidence of
the plaintiffs sexual history to show that the "plaintiff sexually
'teased' other jail inmates, including some of the black inmates who,
he alleges, sexually assaulted him."" The defendants were allowed
this evidence because the plaintiff claimed he had been a "target of
sexual taunting and harassment," and the defendants therefore had
a right to "try to rebut that evidence with evidence that plaintiff
himself was engaging in sexual teasing and taunting. 3 8 9 The court
made an implicit analogy to the unwritten exception to Rule 412 in
criminal cases, discussed above, that if the prosecution "opens the
door" on the issue of the victim's sexual history, then the defendant
382. Id. The Rule puts the burden on the proponent of the evidence to assert the
reasons that the evidence is admissible; it does not place the burden on the opponent
to convince the court that the evidence is inadmissible.
383. 163 F.R.D. 617 (D. Utah 1995).
384. See id at 619-20.
385. Id. at 619.
386. See id. The court had also ruled in an earlier discovery order to allow
extensive deposing of plaintiff as to other sexual harassment in a prior em-
ployment relationship. Without determining admissibility, the court has
said if a modus operandi of sexual harassment claims can be shown, such
evidence may be admissible on whether the harassment alleged in this case
actually occurred. However, this allowance may not be used to justify pry-
ing in to unrelated sexual activities or history that merely attacks plaintiff's
character and subjects her to harassment or unjustified embarrassment not
rationally incident to the litigation.
Id. at 621 n.3 (citations omitted).
387. 932 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
388. Id. at 1128.
389. Id.
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is allowed to explore the issue fully. By asserting that he was a tar-
get for sexual assault and harassment by other inmates, the plaintiff
"opened the door."3 90
3. Cases Discussing the Rationale of the Amended Rule
Tne and time again, courts have expressed their perceptions that
Rule 412 is primarily one of policy; irrelevance is rarely mentioned
as the reason for the Rule 412 exclusions of evidence of the victim's
sexual history. Undoubtedly this view of the purpose of the Rule
affects the decisions made by courts, especially when the evidence is
being considered under the balancing test of the civil subsection of
the Rule, where the probative value is weighed against the potential
harm to any victim and unfair prejudice to any party.
In Sheffield, the court explained its belief that the Rule was en-
acted "to protect rape victims from humiliating and excessive cross-
examination with regard to their past sexual behavior."3 91 In ruling
on a protection from discovery request, the court in Stalnaker v.
KMart Corp.3" concluded that the evidence should be protected be-
cause "[s]uch discovery is potentially embarrassing and annoy-
ing."3" In Barta, the court noted that some discovery of the victim's
sexual history was prohibited because it would "subject [the victim]
to embarrassment, oppression, or harassment." 394
Courts have often failed to perceive that such evidence tends to
be irrelevant and have also viewed the Rule as based solely on a
policy, a policy that excludes relevant evidence. In Blackaon, the
court summed up its understanding of the Rule for civil cases:
In civil cases like this one, the rule by no means prohibits
evidence of the alleged victim's sexual conduct or sexual pre-
disposition, for such evidence may be highly relevant in many
390. The defendant was also allowed to introduce evidence that the plaintiff was
a homosexual, and that he had been engaged in a "consensual homosexual relation-
ship." Id. This was admissible to show the plaintiff's bias against one of the defend-
ants, who had refused to return the plaintiff's cell mate, his alleged homosexual
partner, to his cell. See Id. at 1129. The court stated: "Admitting evidence of this
consensual homosexual relationship may be embarrassing to Blackmon ... [but]
Blackmon has come forward with no evidence of unusual harm or unfair prejudice
that might result to him from admission of evidence of the relationship." Id. In
addition, the plaintiff pointed out to the court that even if he had engaged in "sexual
teasing," that is not a defense to sexual assault. See UL at 1128. The court agreed
with the plaintiff on this point, but held that since this was not directly a claim for
sexual assault against the perpetrators, but rather against negligent jail officials, and
the central issue was whether the officials had sufficient notice of the risk of harm to
the plaintiff, the evidence was therefore admissible. See id.
391. Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 895 F. Supp. 105, 107 (ED. Va.
1995).
392. 71 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705 (D. Kan. 1996).
393. Id. at 707.
394. Barta v. City & County of Honolulu, 169 F.RD. 132, 137 (D. Haw. 1996).
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civil cases.... [T]he rule requires courts to consider precisely
the potential relevance of such evidence and to prevent its use
for purposes of exploiting stereotypes or subjecting a party or
witness to gratuitous embarrassment and invasion of
privacy.3 95
The application of Rule 412 has been inhibited by this narrow view
of the Rule and by a reluctance to recognize that often the evidence
of the victim's sexual history is irrelevant and is being exploited,
either to prejudice the jury unfairly or to harass the victim into
dropping the charges altogether.
D. Commentary, Criticisms, and Summary of Amended Rule 412
Several criticisms can be made of amended Rule 412.396 The ex-
clusion of the "notwithstanding any other provision of law" clauses,
although intended to ensure the recognition of constitutional rights,
may have gone too far in the other direction. In United States v.
Platero,3 7 the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant should have
been allowed to confront fully the victim-witness about a relation-
ship the trial judge had determined never existed.398 By leaving the
determination to the jury, the judge allowed the defendant to enter
highly prejudicial evidence. The jury was given the option of disbe-
lieving the evidence, but only after it had already been aired. Thus
the purpose of Rule 412 was defeated entirely.
Rather than ensuring protection of victims, the expansion of the
Rule to civil cases gives trial court judges more discretionary
power.399 This may make it difficult to construe the Rule to do jus-
tice in cases not envisioned by the Rule's drafters, even though the
Rule was created purposefully to be flexible to accommodate those
unforeseen circumstances.4 °° The lack of symmetry between the
395. Blackmon v. Buckner, 932 F. Supp. at 1128 (emphasis added).
396. Some commentators believe that extending the Rule to cover civil cases
makes the Rule difficult to defend. See 23 WRIGrr & GRAHM Supp., supra note
278, § 5382.1, at 167. They ask, in the context of a civil sexual harassment action:
Is it unreasonable for the defendant to suppose that a woman who dresses
to expose her breasts or a man who wears jeans so tight you can count the
pimples on his buttocks is "inviting" others to look at these portions of
their anatomy even though others, including the plaintiff, consider such a
gaze to be "sexual harassment"?
Id.
397. 72 F.3d 806 (10th Cir. 1995).
398. See id. at 809, 815-16.
399. See 23 WRIGrr & GRAHAM Supp., supra note 278, § 5382.1, at 168.
400. See id. Some commentators have asked:
Is it possible that these constructions of the Rule will dilute the protection
of the Rule for its original beneficiaries-rape victims-or that strict appli-
cation of the Rule as written in cases where the justice of such application
is problematic will trivialize or delegitimate the sound principles that sup-
ported it in its original version?
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criminal and civil provisions of the Rules has also been criticized,40 1
even though many other rules distinguish their applications between
civil and criminal rules.'
One major shortfall of the Rule as a policy measure is that evi-
dence of the victim's sexual history is excluded only if it is offered to
prove the victim's sexual behavior or sexual predisposition.4
Although the Advisory Committee's Note indicates that the Rule
applies whether the information is offered as substantive evidence
or for impeachment,4°4 the Rule nonetheless only applies when the
evidence is being offered to prove the victim's sexual behavior or
predisposition. Consequently, "[t]here is always the danger that un-
scrupulous counsel might offer 'evidence of' sexual behavior or pre-
disposition for some other purpose with the hope or expectation
that the jury might use it for the impermissible purpose.
The balancing test of Rule 412 is difficult for courts to apply, espe-
cially in the context of discovery motions."' At such an early stage
in the proceedings, the relevance of information is often difficult to
ascertain. One court noted:
However difficult this balancing of interests may be at the
time of trial, it is substantially more difficult when made at the
time of discovery and before the facts, issues, and positions of
the parties have crystallized and before a majority of the evi-
dence surrounding the alleged incident is in the possession of
the parties, much less before the court.4°7
In discovery proceedings, Rule 412 must be considered in conjunc-
tion with Rule 26 "in order not to undermine the rationale of Rule
412."11 Each trial court must ask: "[W]hether the information
401. See Monnin, supra note 298, at 1184.
402. See it For example, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 apply only to
criminal cases, yet Federal Rule of Evidence 415, regarding similar evidence, applies
only in civil cases. See FED. R. Evm. 413; FED. R. EvrD. 414; Fm. R. EvrI. 415.
403. See 23 WmuGamr & GRAm. Sure., supra note 278, § 5384.1, at 187.
404. See FED. R. Evm. 412 advisory committee's note.
405. 23 WRiGaT & GRAHAM StpP., supra note 278, § 5384.1, at 187.
406. The balancing test is actually "content free [and] somewhat subjective and
unclear." Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 163, at 13. The Washington
Supreme Court has held that the state court "cannot use prejudice and embarrass-
ment to the victim as part of the balancing process" because those considerations are
already implicitly incorporated into the state's rule; to consider them again would
constitute double counting. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHat Supp., supra note 278, § 5392,
at 242 (citing State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1983)). The court went on to
hold that the "only factors to be considered are the integrity of the factfinding pro-
cess and the defendant's right to a fair trial." Id. (citing State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d
514 (Wash. 1983)).
407. Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93-C4397, 1995 WL 117886, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 15, 1995).
408. Stalnaker v. KMart Corp., No. CIV.A.95-2444-GTV, 1996 WL 397563, at *3
(D. Kan. July 11, 1996) (citations omitted). See also Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co.,
No. 93-C4397, 1995 WL 117886 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1995). Other discovery rules,
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sought... is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence in light of the parties' claims and defenses, while re-
maining mindful of the policy underlying Rule 412."' 1
In summary, the application of Rule 412 to civil cases has pre-
vented much irrelevant or only slightly relevant evidence of the vic-
tim's sexual history from being introduced in evidence or even
discovered. Although the Rule does not apply directly to discovery
proceedings, courts have employed the Rule, as instructed in the
Advisory Committee's Note, to discovery proceedings. This has re-
sulted in the exclusion of some questions soliciting irrelevant or only
slightly relevant information from discovery depositions or
interrogatories.
Defendants can still obtain and admit evidence of the plaintiff's
sexual past, however, in several situations. The most prevalent is
when the plaintiff claims emotional or psychological damages as a
result of the sexual harassment or assault. It is arguable that in
every sexual harassment case where the plaintiff asserts damages go-
ing beyond the actual incident she will be subject to the use of the
sexual history to rebut or deny her damages.41 0
VI. RECOMMENDATION FOR MAINE TO ENACT A
SEXUAL HARASSMENT SHIELD
A. General Arguments For and Against Sexual Harassment
Shields
Sexual harassment is a pervasive problem in today's society. Be-
tween forty and eighty percent of all women have reported exper-
iencing some form of sexual harassment in their lives.41 Just like
the criminal complainant, "[t]he civil plaintiff files her claim often at
a humiliating and degrading expense. This loss of privacy leads in-
exorably to the underreporting of sexual harassment offenses., 41
2
Furthermore, although the EEOC is the agency responsible for pur-
suing sexual harassment complaints, "it is the private plaintiff who is
such as Rule 37, have also been utilized to make a motion based on evidence falling
under Rule 412. See Ramirez v. Nabil's, Inc., No. Civ.A. 94-2396-GTV, 1995 WL
609415 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995); Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 500 (D.N.M. 1996).
Rule 412(c) also provides a mechanism for motions to be made regarding evidence
within the purview of Rule 412. See Biggs v. Nicewonger, Co., 897 F. Supp. 483 (D.
Or. 1995) (discussing plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude sexual history evidence);
Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 895 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Va. 1995) (discussing
motions in limine made by both parties concerning sexual history evidence).
409. Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. at 502.
410. See Ramirez v. Nabil's, Inc., No. Civ.A. 94-2396-GTV, 1995 WL 609415 (D.
Kan. Oct. 5, 1995); Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93-C4397, 1995 WL 117886
(N.D. IlI. Mar. 15, 1995).
411. See Weisberg, supra note 319, at 725.
412. Monnin, supra note 298, at 1183 (footnote omitted).
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ultimately responsible for the prosecution of her grievance."413 Pri-
vate plaintiffs must apply to the EEOC for a right-to-sue notice and
must then follow through in the civil court system.414 Thus, if the
purpose of amended Rule 412 is to encourage reporting of sexual
crimes by protecting the privacy rights of victims, the extension of
Rule 412 to civil cases contributes to that end.
Furthermore, if the purpose of Rule 412 is to prevent the harass-
ing use of needlessly embarrassing and humiliating exposure of the
victim's sexual history, then the extension of Rule 412 to civil cases,
and to sexual predisposition, also contributes to that end. By al-
lowing a judge to consider the harm to any victim or the unfair prej-
udice to any party, as weighed against the probative value of the
evidence, the Rule allows for exclusion of the evidence. Neverthe-
less, because the Rule does not apply directly to discovery, this in-
formation can still be requested during discovery in order to
embarrass and humiliate the victim and to discourage her from
pressing her claim.
If the purpose of Rule 412 is to prevent the use of irrelevant evi-
dence of the victim's sexual history, however, then the extension to
civil cases is problematic due to the current substantive standard of
sexual harassment, "unwelcomeness." Because evidence of the vic-
tim's sexual past is not probative of the "unwelcomeness" of the
defendant's sexual advances, its exclusion does not eclipse the de-
fendant's right to present relevant evidence in his defense. Because
courts often view evidence of the victim's sexual history as relevant
to her "sexual predisposition," however, the evidence is not categor-
ically excluded. Until the standard of "unwelcomeness" is modified,
the Rule's civil provision does not fully prevent the admission of the
victim's past sexual behavior. Armed with the "unwelcomeness"
standard, the Rule's critics argue that "the categorical exclusion of
sexual history evidence denies the defendant substantive legal
rights."4 ' Nevertheless,
[t]his objection presupposes that the ban on sexual history evi-
deuce, or at least the presumption against its use, will deny the
defendant access to essential evidence. As enacted, however,
Amended Rule 412 excepts from the sexual harassment shield
evidence of sexual behavior or sexual predisposition that is of
sufficient probative value.... [E]vidence that is truly proba-
tive of this issue remains well within [a defendant's] reach.4 16
A faction remains which argues that amended Federal Rule 412
"goes no further than to codify existing federal case law on sexual
harassment, and it continues to rely upon individual judges to make
413. Id. at 1194.
414. See id. & n.182.
415. Id. at 1183.
416. Id. at 1184 (footnote omitted).
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decisions about probative value, prejudicial effect, and the relative
weight of these factors., 417 Nevertheless, commentators generally
agree that amended Rule 412 "significantly narrows the range of
evidence available to the defendant. 4 18
In Maine, if Rule 412 were extended to civil cases, it would help
prevent the misuse of evidence of the victim's "sexual predisposi-
tion" in civil cases, provide protection for a sexual harassment plain-
tiff's right to privacy, and exclude irrelevant evidence in trials and
throughout the discovery process.
B. Elements of Sexual Harassment Under Maine Law
The Maine Fair Employment Act prohibits certain types of em-
ployment discrimination:
It is unlawful... [flor any employer to fail or refuse to hire or
otherwise discriminate against any applicant for employment
because of... sex... or, because of those reasons to discharge
an employee or discriminate with respect to hire, tenure, pro-
motion, transfer, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
of employment or any other matter directly or indirectly re-
lated to employment .... 4 19
Maine law recognizes both forms of sexual harassment in the work-
place established in the EEOC guidelines: quid pro quo harassment
and hostile environment harassment.42 0 The Law Court has had
only a few occasions to rule on sexual harassment cases since it was
recognized as a cause of action in Maine in 1989 and has instituted
the "unwelcomeness" standard that prevails in the federal cause of
action.42'
417. Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence" Masculine Norms vs. Feminist
Reforms, 19 HAiv. WoM:sN's LJ. 127, 138 (1996) (footnote omitted).
418. Monnin, supra note 298, at 1160.
419. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996-1997).
420. See id.; Bowen v. Department of Human Servs., 606 A.2d 1051 (Me. 1992).
See also Monnin, supra note 298, at 1163-64.
421. In Bowen, a case of first impression, the Law Court found that the plaintiff
would have had a cause of action for sexual harassment if she had been able to
establish that vulgar speech was used in her presence in the workplace and directed
at her because she was a woman. Bowen v. Department of Human Servs., 606 A.2d
at 1053-54. The court relied on federal sexual harassment statutes and precedent for
guidance. See id. at 1053. In Nadeau v. Rainbow Rugs, 675 A.2d 973 (Me. 1996), the
Law Court found that a hostile work environment could be created by merely one
incident of sexual harassment; a pattern of harassment need not have occurred. The
court adopted the federal standard laid out in Meritor Savings Bank, that both an
objective reasonable person would have found the environment hostile and that the
victim subjectively found the environment abusive. See id. at 976. In Knox v. Com-
bined Ins. Co. of America, 542 A.2d 363 (Me. 1988), the Law Court held that sexual
assaults and sexual harassments in the workplace were compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act. See id, at 366.
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C. Drafting a Sexual Harassment Shield for Maine Rule 412
If the Advisory Committee for the Maine Rules of Evidence were
to draft a civil provision of Rule 412, it should consider utilizing a
specific exception approach to the Rule, the same that is used in the
criminal section of the Rule. Specific exceptions would allow the
evidence only in the form of specific instances of conduct, thus re-
maining consistent with the other provisions of the Rule. Such a
provision might read:
In a civil case in which a person is accused of sexual harass-
ment, sexual assault, or other sexual misconduct, the only evi-
dence of a victim's past sexual behavior that may be admitted
is the following.
(1) Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior
with the accused, offered by the accused or the victim
upon the issue of whether the sexual advances of the
accused were or were not "unwelcome. ,422
(2) Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior,
known to the defendant at the time of the alleged
sexual misconduct, offered by the accused or the vic-
tim upon the issue of his or her mistaken belief that
the sexual advances were welcomed.
The Rule should also require an in camera hearing for all evi-
dence offered as admissible under Rule 412. Such a provision could
be based on the Federal Rule, which reads:
Procedure to Determine Admissibility:
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under [this
rule] must:
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days
before trial specifically describing the evi-
dence and stating the purpose for which it is
offered ....
(B) serve the motion on all parties and no-
tify the alleged victim ....
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the
court must conduct a hearing in camera and afford
the victim and parties a right to attend and be heard.
The motion, related papers, and the record of the
hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless
the court orders otherwise.4 2
3
Although the Federal Rule's Advisory Committee's Note dictates
the application of the Rule's principle to discovery proceedings, dis-
covery abuse remains rampant, even though some judges have used
422. Unfortunately, the unwelcomeness standard is infused in the law of sexual
harassment, therefore it must be included in the Rule until the standard is changed.
A rule of evidence should not be used to enact substantive changes in the law.
423. FED. R. Evin. 412(c).
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their discretion to apply Rule 412 in discovery proceedings.4' The
Advisory Committee's Note to the Maine Rule should be revised to
express an intent that the Rule be routinely considered in discovery
proceedings, to prevent the use of discovery to intimidate the plain-
tiff and discourage her from pressing her claim.
The balancing test should be avoided because it creates inconsis-
tent application of the Rule among trial courts. Furthermore, the
Federal Rule's balancing test does not include all the elements of
the traditional Rule 403 balancing test and thus engenders confu-
sion. In order to narrow and define the scope of that evidence, spe-
cific exceptions should be utilized.
In sum, the extension of the scope of Maine Rule of Evidence 412
to include civil cases is necessary and would provide the beneficial
effects of the prevention of the misuse of relevant but prejudicial
evidence of the victim's sexual history, the exclusion of wholly irrel-
evant evidence of the victim's sexual history, and the preservation of
the victim's right to privacy.
VII. CONCLUSION
Is there a viable concept of "sexual predisposition" under the
law? If so, shouldn't the principles of the rules regarding character
evidence apply? Does a person have a right to privacy, in effect a
privilege, regarding his or her past sexual behavior, no matter what
its probative value? Is the misuse of evidence of the victim's sexual
history to invoke stereotypes and find fault the only justifiable moti-
vation behind Rule 412? Can evidence of the victim's sexual past be
evaluated on the basis of its relevance?
All of the above questions should have been addressed by the
drafters of the federal and Maine rape shield rules. By framing the
Rules as supported solely by policy, and ignoring relevance argu-
ments, the drafters of the Rules failed to confront the sexual stereo-
types surrounding a female sexual assault victim's sexual history. By
failing to confront those stereotypes, namely that the victim's sexual
history is relevant to her credibility or her consent, the drafters im-
plicitly accepted them. Relevance analyses were left to individual
courts, which resulted in an inconsistent application of the Rules
and the creation of further confusion when it appears that there may
be a conflict between the exclusion of the evidence and the defend-
ant's constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the approach taken to the potential conflict be-
tween evidence excluded by the Rules and the defendant's constitu-
tional rights depends upon the reason the Rules exclude the
evidence. Evidence excluded for lack of relevance cannot violate
424. See Barta v. City & County of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Haw. 1996);
Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 895 F. Supp. 105 (ED. Va. 1995).
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the defendant's constitutional rights since the defendant's compul-
sory process right and right to confront witnesses encompass only
relevant evidence. 41 If evidence is excluded because of a policy,
however, the defendant's constitutional rights must be balanced
against the state's interests; the evidence may still be constitution-
ally excluded if the state's interests outweigh the defendant's. 4
Evidence which is excludable on the dual bases of irrelevance and
policy is currently excluded on the basis of policy, according to
Maine and Federal Rules of Evidence 412.
The justification for the Rule should dictate in deciding whether
the rape shield rule should be extended to civil cases in Maine. If
the Rule is one of relevance, there is a strong case to be made that
the sexual history of a victim is wholly irrelevant to whether she
welcomed the advances in question. If the Rule is one of policy,
however, it allows trial court judges who believe the evidence is rel-
evant to the victim's welcoming of the advances to admit the evi-
dence. And if the Rule is a privilege, then it would weigh heavily in
a civil case and provide a bar to the introduction of even highly rele-
vant evidence. Nevertheless, the Rules' drafters, courts, and com-
mentators have repeatedly viewed the Rules as based on policy,
thereby preventing a more candid and meaningful questioning of
whether evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior is relevant or
not.
Rebekah Smith
425. See United States v. Kasto, 584 F2d 268, 272 (8th Cir. 1978).
426. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
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